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ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEABILITY
SEEMA KAKADE1
ABSTRACT
There are great expectations for a resurgence in federal
environmental enforcement in a Biden-led federal government. Indeed,
federal environmental enforcement suffered serious blows during the Trump
Administration, particularly at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
including large cuts in the budget for enforcement and reversals of key
enforcement policies. Yet, while important to repair the damage, truly
strengthening federal environmental enforcement will require more. This
Article highlights the need for greater attention to the multiple hurdles that
plague environmental enforcement. In doing so it makes three contributions
to the literature. First, it asserts that even though environmental statutes,
regulations, and guidance documents often contain “enforceable” as an
explicit term, in practice the term lacks scope and definition, making the
actual enforceability of regulations dubious. Second, it demonstrates the
difficulties with actual enforceability by examining key hurdles that become
legal defenses for corporate and government defendants in environmental
enforcement matters regarding regulatory exceptions, evidentiary standards,
and the preemption and preclusion doctrines. Third, it recommends that
drafters of environmental laws and regulations consider actual
enforceability by considering, within the documents they are drafting, the
likely hurdles for enforcers after the law or regulation becomes effective.
Although hurdles in environmental enforcement are important for regulatory
flexibility, judicial expediency, and other normative values, they often result
in a tradeoff for achieving enforceability of environmental laws and
regulations. Grappling with such tradeoffs, within the law or regulation
itself, is essential for meeting the expectations for enforcement held by
regulated entities, researchers, environmental advocates, and most of all,
local communities. After all, as noted in a March 2021 Grist news article,
“laws are only as good as their enforcement.”2
1
Seema Kakade is an Associate Professor and Director of the Environmental Law Clinic
at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. She formerly worked as
an attorney for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Compliance and
Enforcement Assurance. The author would like to thank Michael Sammartino for his
invaluable student research assistance on this article.
2
Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump,
THE GRIST (Mar. 1, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-lawenforcement-trump/.
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INTRODUCTION
The Biden Administration has put environmental justice and climate
change at center stage of the federal government’s regulatory and policy
agenda.3 In particular, the Biden Administration has signaled a desire to
tackle environmental issues not only by enacting new regulatory programs,
but also by improving environmental enforcement. Within its first 100 days,
the Biden Administration issued an Executive Order specifically directing the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) “to develop a comprehensive
environmental justice enforcement strategy” (emphasis added) and EPA to
3

The Biden-Harris Administration Immediate Priorities, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/priorities/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).
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“strengthen enforcement of environmental violations” (emphasis added).4
The stated goal of such an enforcement strategy is to “provide timely
remedies for systemic environmental violations and contaminations, and
injury to natural resources.”5 The question, of course, is how the federal
government will actually achieve such a worthy goal, particularly when
previous federal administrations have issued very similar Executive Orders
and still struggled to improve the connection between enforcement and long
term solutions for environmental justice.6
This article is one of three by this author that explores challenges with
environmental enforcement.7 The first article, published in 2020, focuses on
the final stage of environmental enforcement—remedies.8 It considers the
many questions that arise when formulating remedies in environmental
enforcement cases, including the purpose of the remedy, legal authority of
the enforcer to get the remedy, and who benefits from the remedy. The second
article, published in 2020, focuses on the beginning stage of environmental
enforcement—how to find potential violations.9 It examines government
agencies’ use of information gathering authority, including their ability to
require monitoring and reporting, to deter and detect potential cheating on
environmental regulations. This article focuses on the middle stage of
environmental enforcement—getting from detection to remedy. It argues that
environmental violations are difficult to prove once identified, particularly
when regulated entities can use multiple arguments that the environmental
legal and regulatory system provides, as defenses.
In noting wide-ranging problems with environmental noncompliance
by a variety of regulated entities, legal scholars, practitioners, and journalists
have tried to understand the gaps in enforcement. Indeed, as many note,
4

Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, Exec. Order No. 14,033, 86 Fed.
Reg. 7619, Sec. 222 (Jan. 27, 2021).
5
Id.
6
President Clinton signed Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations, on February 11, 1994. Exec. Order No. 12,898,
59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). The Order instructs each Federal agency to “make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission” with specific attention to enforcement
for DOJ and EPA.
7
The author acknowledges that many aspects of environmental enforcement discussed
in the three articles, also apply to other areas of public sector oriented enforcement such as
in consumer protection, market manipulation, or civil rights. This series of articles however,
focuses on environmental enforcement issues, particularly government agency and citizen
suit enforcement under major federal environmental laws dealing with pollution, natural
resources, and energy delivery/efficiency.
8
Seema Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 117 (2020).
9
Seema Kakade & Matt Haber, Detecting Corporate Environmental Cheating, 47
ECOLOGY L.Q. 772 (2020).
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significant reasons for the challenges in environmental enforcement are lack
of government agency resources and political pressures.10 At the detection
stage alone, enforcement agencies need resources to conduct inspections at
specific facilities, buy expensive equipment to measure potential violations
at inspections, and review massive amounts of self-reported data from
regulated entities.11 Enforcement agencies also need resources, like advanced
computer technology, to identify complex violations, patterns of noncompliance across industries, or attempts by regulated entities to outright
cheat on environmental regulations. Moreover, enforcement agencies can
face serious political challenges, particularly in pursuing remedies for
enforcement violations. The Trump Administration, for example, issued
multiple policies limiting agency authority to seek penalties and injunctive
relief in enforcement actions.12
Yet continued focus on resource and political hurdles alone
shortchanges discussion about the steeper challenges with environmental
enforcement that relate to the legal and regulatory system itself.13 While
environmental regulatory design may offer compliance flexibility to
regulated entities, such flexibility often manifests in extensive exceptions and
forgiving pollution limits, creating obstacles for actual enforcement.14 While
environmental statutes may provide enforcement authority for federal
agencies, state agencies, and citizen groups, in reality the preemption and
preclusion doctrines often impede actual enforcement.15 Regulatory and legal
10
Naveena Sadasivam, Inside Biden’s Uphill Battle to Restore the EPA After Trump,
THE GRIST (Mar. 1, 2021), https://grist.org/politics/epa-joe-biden-environmental-lawenforcement-trump/ (discussing long term decline in funding and shifting political priorities
for environmental enforcement since the 1990s).
11
Indeed, in a May 4, 2021 internal EPA memo, the EPA Acting Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement told federal enforcement staff to increase its inspections and take action
where state enforcement officials are not acting fast enough. See Kelsey Brugger, Internal
EPA Memo Urges Agents to Up Inspections, E&E NEWS (May 4, 2021),
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2021/05/04/stories/1063731691 (“[I]f there is a situation
where a community’s health may be impacted by noncompliance and our co-regulator is not
taking timely or appropriate action, we should not hesitate to step in and take necessary
action,” the memo reads.).
12
David J. Hayes, The Vanishing Federal Role in Enforcing our Environmental Laws,
THE REG REVIEW (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/10/12/hayesvanishing-federal-role-enforcing-environmental-laws/.
13
Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf
(introducing series of white papers on why the answer to enforcement challenges is in
effective design of regulations).
14
Marshal J. Bregar, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J.
325 (1996).
15
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011);
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hurdles impede environmental enforcement just as much as resource and
political hurdles. Moreover, as this article discusses, resource and political
hurdles are often intertwined with regulatory and legal hurdles.
Despite these difficulties surrounding enforcement, several
environmental statutes, regulations, and guidance documents explicitly
include the concept of “enforceability.” Such inclusion demonstrates an
intent by drafters to create environmental laws that can actually be enforced.
For example, environmental statues like the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the
Clean Water Act (CWA) require states to have plans for implementation of
pollution programs that are “enforceable.”16 Guidance implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) refers to “enforceable”
mitigation measures during the environmental review process for major
federal actions.17 Further, pollution-trading programs, such as in greenhouse
gas regulation, require that credits be quantifiable, verifiable, permanent, and
“enforceable.”18 As this article describes, such term “enforceable” has limited
meaning without recognition of the hurdles in the way to actual enforcement.
The point of this article is not to suggest that there should be no
hurdles to environmental enforcement. Indeed, there are good reasons that
regulatory flexibility, evidentiary standards, and the preemption and
preclusion doctrines exist.19 It is important, however, to acknowledge that
such hurdles exist and manifest as powerful defenses for regulated entities
that become defendants in enforcement matters.20 Without an
acknowledgment of real hurdles in enforcement, broader conversations
around strengthening environmental enforcement cannot go beyond (albeit
important) resource concerns. The defense, for example, of “the
environmental regulation allows me to pollute” is a tough one for any
enforcement agency to manage, even with all the resources and political

Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
16
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k).
17
Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the CEQ, to Heads of Federal
Departments
and
Agencies
7
n.18
(Jan.
14,
2011),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/06/f35/NEPACEQ_Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf (“This guidance approves of
the use of the ‘mitigated FONSI’ when the NEPA process results in enforceable mitigation
measures.”).
18
See, e.g., Rule 250-301 Sacramento Carbon Exchange Program (adopted Mar. 25,
2010), http://www.airquality.org/ProgramCoordination/Documents/rule250.pdf (“To be
certified as carbon credits, the emission reductions shall meet the requirements of an
approved protocol for a specific project type and consider any Sacramento specific
conditions or requirements to be real, additional, quantifiable, verifiable, permanent, and
enforceable.”).
19
See Section II, infra.
20
See Section II, infra.
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support in the world.21 Furthermore, without acknowledging such a barrier,
local communities have difficulty grasping the reasons behind why
environmental enforcement fails to meet their hopes and expectations.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on
environmental regulations, compliance, noncompliance, and enforcement as
related but distinct topics. Part II describes the resource, regulatory, and legal
hurdles that enforcers face in pursuing environmental violations, particularly
as related to pollution (and pollution abatement) standards. Part III
demonstrates how enforcement hurdles manifest in one case study of
significant environmental noncompliance: tampering with air emissions
controls on cars and trucks. Part IV identifies the term “enforceable” and its
usage in key federal environmental statutes and argues for a consistent and
deliberate use of the term in a way that reflects an understanding of the
hurdles that arise as defenses in later enforcement cases. The article then
concludes with remarks on the broader applicability of environmental
enforceability in the international context.
I. BACKGROUND
It is impossible to talk about environmental enforcement without first
understanding a bit about the historical and current context of environmental
regulation and compliance with such regulation. Enforcement only exists if a
there is a law or regulation to enforce in the first place. Enforcement also only
exists if there is noncompliance, but as this section describes, identifying and
proving noncompliance is often complicated. Such an understanding is
important for ultimately addressing enforcement hurdles.
A. Law and Regulation
In the United States, the current model of environmental regulation
focuses heavily on reducing costs for industry. As scholars have noted, all
social and economic regulation began to receive significant pushback in the
twentieth century in response to the expansion of regulation that occurred
during the New Deal and postwar periods.22 Presidents Ford and Carter made
inroads in the 1970’s to advance environmental protection through new laws
21
Stuart Parker, EPA Faults Texas Air Permits Amid Looming Fights Over Trump-Era
Policy, INSIDEEPA (Aug. 9, 2021) (EPA Administrator Michael Regan in recent decisions
has twice faulted Texas air regulators for their failure to ensure state-issued air quality
permits are fully enforceable but the instant disputes did not present an opportunity for the
agency to address environmentalists’ broader calls to reverse a Trump-era policy of deferring
to state permit decisions.”).
22
Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 639–
40 (2012).
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and regulations. However, President Reagan pursued a comprehensive policy
of regulatory pushback by consolidating regulatory oversight in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and requiring agencies to justify proposed
rules on the basis of the relative costs and benefits they were expected to
generate.23 To this day, cost-benefit analysis has shaped a federal
environmental regulatory system that is complex and varied in its
requirements.24 As described in Table 1 below, federal environmental
regulations involve a mix of different kinds of regulated entities and
government agencies. An environmental regulation may issue from a federal
agency across any number of subject specific executive branch mission areas,
including environment, securities, consumer protection, zoning, and energy.
An environmental regulation may target an industry entity as the regulated
entity, but also might target a government agency entity.25 An environmental
regulation may include substantial requirements for regulated entities, such
as mandating significant capital expenditures for pollution control
equipment, or may merely include recordkeeping requirements.26 Further
complicating Table 1 is the fact that the listed types of environmental
regulations are not mutually exclusive, but rather overlap and intertwine.

23

Id. at 639–40; Helen G. Boutrous, Regulatory Review in the Obama Administration:
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 243, 255–56 (2010); Daniel A.
Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383 (2019).
24
Table 1 largely adapts from a 1995 document assessing mechanism for how
government encourages or forces facilities to achieve society’s environmental goals. See
Environmental Policy Tools: A User’s Guide, U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT (1995), https://ota.fas.org/reports/9517.pdf.
25
G. Nelson Smith, III, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Enforcement Actions Against
Municipalities for Failure to Comply with the Clean Air Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685, 712
(1993).
26
See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration Basic Information, US EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/prevention-significant-deterioration-basic-information (last visited
Sept. 16, 2021) (discussing regulatory requirements that require installation of pollution
controls); Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Stationary Refrigeration, US
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/section608/recordkeeping-and-reporting-requirementsstationary-refrigeration (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (discussing regulations that require
recordkeeping and reporting).
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Table 1: Common Types of Federal Environmental Regulations
Type
Performance-Based

Description
Describe required end results, leaving regulated
entities free to choose compliance methods.
Design
Describe required emissions limits based on what
a model technology might achieve; regulated
entities use the model technology or demonstrate
that another approach achieves equivalent results.
Technology
Specify the technology or technique a regulated
entity must use to control its pollution.
Integrated
Incorporate multiple requirements into a single
Permitting
permit rather than having a permit for each
individual emissions source at a facility.
Trackable Emissions Allow regulated entities to trade emission control
responsibilities among themselves, provided the
aggregate regulatory cap on emissions is met.
Challenge
Give target group of sources responsibility for
Regulations
designing and implementing a program to achieve
a target goal, with a government-imposed program
or sanction if goal is unmet by the deadline.
Pollution Charges
Require regulated entity to pay fixed dollar
amount for each unit of pollution emitted or
disposed; no ceiling on emissions.
Liability
Require entities causing pollution that adversely
affects others to compensate those harmed to the
extent of the damage.
Pollution
Require entities to report (either publicly or in
Information
response to government subpoena) emissions,
Reporting
discharge, or product information.
Bans
Ban or restrict manufacture, distribution, use, or
disposal of products that present unreasonable
risks.
Environmental
Require government agencies (or indirectly,
Review
industry project applicants) to assess the
environmental impact of a proposed project that
receives government funding.
Corporate
Require certain private corporate entities to
Disclosure
disclose risks to shareholders and securities filings.
Environmental
Require truth in advertising regarding
Advertising
environmental attributes of products.
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B. Noncompliance
The complexity of environmental regulations makes for an even more
complex picture of noncompliance with those regulations. There is simply no
easy way to assess broad-level noncompliance rates because doing so is
always dependent upon so many factors.27 Certainly, some legal scholars
have opined that particular types of environmental regulations may allow for
higher rates of noncompliance than other types of regulation.28 However, in
general, compliance with both paperwork (e.g. recordkeeping and reporting)
and physical (e.g. disposal and discharge) regulations are difficult to assess
and to achieve.29 Moreover, the many kinds of noncompliance that exist, from
mistakes to outright cheating, mean that noncompliance data alone does not
always give a complete picture.
First, noncompliance rates depend on information.30 For
environmental statutes and regulations that require self-monitoring and selfreporting of violations, determining compliance rates is much easier than
those that do not.31 Indeed, Cynthia Giles, the former head of compliance and
enforcement at EPA in the Obama Administration, has stressed in her
research and writing the importance of established and reliable measurement
27

CYNTHIA GILES, PART 2: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL RULES IS WORSE
YOU
THINK
5
(Apr.
14,
2020),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Part-2-FINAL.pdf.
28
Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 525 (2017) (performance based measures depend on the ability of government
agencies to specify, measure, and monitor performance, and reliable and appropriate
information about performance may sometimes be difficult or impossible to obtain); Lesley
K. McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and Trade
Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 309 (2007) (“Compliance under the Clean Air Act
was more difficult to assess than under other traditional technology-based regulation such as
the Clean Water Act, in part because permits were not required for individual sources[.]”).
29
J.B. Ruhl et al., Environmental Compliance: Another Integrity Crisis or Too Many
Rules?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 24–26 (2002).
30
Michael E. Wall, Is There a Proper Level of Compliance with Environmental Law?,
39 ABA TRENDS, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 13.
31
See EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 16-P-0164, CLEAN AIR ACT
FACILITY EVALUATIONS ARE CONDUCTED, BUT INACCURATE DATA HINDER EPA
OVERSIGHT AND PUBLIC AWARENESS (May 3, 2016) (noting how insufficient or absent data
frustrates EPA’s ability to effectively evaluate compliance); In a 2007 report, EPA OIG
recognized that the lack of mandatory reporting of compliance data collected by the States
inhibited EPA’s ability to create nationwide compliance statistics. EPA OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 2007-P-0027, OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO MEASURING
COMPLIANCE: PRACTICES IN SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES (2007); D.R. van der Vaart &
John C. Evans, Compliance Under Title V: Yes, No, or I Don’t Know?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
22–24 (2002) (describing data reporting in demonstrating compliance under Title V of
CAA).
THAN
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systems in ensuring compliance with environmental regulations.32 Scholars
that discuss enforcement have also typically focused on monitoring tools for
agency enforcers to achieve goals, emphasizing tools such as electronic
reporting and third-party verification.33 For example, publicly available
monitoring and reporting of water discharges for a variety of pollutants has
generated robust noncompliance data in the context of CWA violations.34 In
contrast, because monitoring and reporting is state specific under the CAA,
there is not a readily available way to identify the extent of a regulated
entity’s compliance and noncompliance with respect to air permits.35 Much
of the data on noncompliance too is anecdotal from inspectors and news
stories.36
Second, because environmental regulations allow significant latitude
on what qualifies as a “requirement” to begin with, noncompliance is tough
to assess. When an environmental regulation undergoes a cost-benefit
analysis, the costs to the regulated entities must be evaluated. Accordingly, a
key goal of the regulation becomes finding ways to make compliance easier
for those entities.37 Simply put, compliance with environmental regulations
is expensive and providing flexibility for regulated entities on how, when,
and where to comply eases the expense.38 As a result, some environmental
regulations impose voluntary standards instead of actual requirements or
32

Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf.
33
David L. Markell et al., Dynamic Governance in Theory and Practice, Part I, 58 ARIZ.
L. REV. 563, 569–70 (2016).
34
See, e.g., JAY SHIMSHACK, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT, & ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & GENERAL DETERRENCE (June 2009),
https://archive.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/compliance/research/web/pdf/meecwhitepaper-task6.pdf; Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the TwentyFirst Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 802–05
(2004) (discussing efficacy of EPA ECHO’s online reporting site in assessing
noncompliance).
35
Adam Babich, The Unfilled Promise of Effective Air Quality and Emissions
Monitoring, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 569, 590 (2018); but note that facilities subject to Title
V of the CAA require compliance certifications and reporting of deviations, see 40 C.F.R.
§ 70.6.
36
Sharon Buccino & Steve Jones, Controlling Water Pollution from Coalbed Methane
Drilling: An Analysis of Discharge Requirements, 4 WYO. L. REV. 559, 576 (2004) (citing
to news article discussing how inspector could perform a compliance inspection on each
coalbed methane site only once during the five-year lifetime of the relevant water permit).
37
David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005).
38
See, e.g., Caroline Cecot, Regulatory Fracture Plugging: Managing Risks to Water
from Shale Development, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 29, 44 (2008) (recommending that State
regulators use cost-benefit analysis to create flexible standards for the natural gas industry).
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allow regulated entities to pay to pollute. Even where there are requirements,
some environmental regulations provide freedom of choice for regulated
entities on how to comply with the requirements or how to demonstrate
compliance.39 Some environmental permits explicitly exclude certain
emissions from the limit or make the permit conditions broad to cover any
flexibility that a regulated facility might argue it needs.40
Third, part of the complication in assessing noncompliance with
environmental regulations is that the compliance metric often does not always
relate directly to actual pollution.41 Noncompliance with an information
disclosure regulation means that a regulated entity failed to report data. 42
Noncompliance with a recordkeeping regulation means that a regulated entity
failed to properly keep or show specific documentation.43 Noncompliance
with an agency environmental review regulation means that the agency did
not conduct an adequate analysis.44 Thus, even though the term
noncompliance or “violation” conjures terrible images of excess pollution,
particularly when discussing pollution and exposure for communities, such
is not always the case.
Fourth, society places varying values on different kinds of
noncompliance, further complicating noncompliance assessments. Indeed,
some law-and-economics scholarship suggest that certain laws (e.g. noncriminal laws) are mere costs of doing business, meaning a certain amount of
deliberate noncompliance should be encouraged when it satisfies a
corporation’s fiduciary responsibility to maximize profitability.45 Willful
39

Dalia Patino-Echeverri, Feasibility of Flexible Technology Standards for Existing
Coal Fired Power Plants and their Implications for New Technology Development, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1896, 1920 (2014) (discussing e.g. the concept of alternative compliance
payments in CAA regulation).
40
See Dietrich Earnhart et al., Discretionary Exemptions from Environmental
Regulation: Flexibility for Good or for Ill (Resources for the Future Working Paper No. 1920, Aug. 2019), https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/discretionary-exemptionsenvironmental-regulation-flexibility-good-or-ill/.
41
J.B. Ruhl et al., Environmental Compliance: Another Integrity Crisis or Too Many
Rules?, 17 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 24–26 (2002).
42
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Toyota Motor Company to Pay $180
Million in Settlement for Decade Long Noncompliance with CAA Reporting Requirements
(Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/toyota-motor-company-pay-180-millionsettlement-decade-long-noncompliance-clean-air-act.
43
See, e.g., News Release, U.S. EPA, Corporate Wide Settlement with Lowe’s (Apr. 17,
2014),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-corporate-widesettlement-lowes-protects-public-lead-pollution.
44
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004) (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (NEPA imposes no duty for
federal agencies to use an environmental review, it only imposes procedural requirements on
federal agencies).
45
Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Compliance, 26 FORDHAM
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noncompliance or fraud by regulated entities may foster a different societal
sentiment than failure to comply by those entities that simply cannot afford
to do so.46 Moreover, certain noncompliance that is longer in time, greater in
amount, or more acute or toxic may be more concerning than other kinds of
noncompliance.47 Thus, while noncompliance is a single term, it hardly
denotes a single idea.
C. Enforcement
When regulated entities fail to comply, or worse, cheat or commit
fraud, enforcement needs to step in.48 Widespread noncompliance threatens
achievement of the underlying public health and natural resource benefits that
the regulation hopes to achieve.49 For example, when multiple countries
adopted strict fuel standards for oceangoing vessels, many worried that the
health benefits anticipated by the standards would never come to fruition
because of rampant expected noncompliance.50 In addition, while some may
ENVTL. L. REV. 450 (2015).
46
KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, WATERED
DOWN JUSTICE 33 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/watered-down-justicereport.pdf (noting difference between willful non-compliance by water utilities versus those
that want to comply but have financial inability to do so and thus need grant funding); see
also Judd F. Sneirson, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Compliance, 26 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 450 (2015) (“And to the extent firms find themselves out of compliance, it
seems to be more a function of not understanding often-complex laws than a conscious
choice to flout the law in order to maximize profits.”).
47
FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 46, at 6 (between 2016-2019, 40 percent of Americans
obtained their water from drinking water systems that were in violation of the Safe Drinking
Water Act and the percentage of water systems in chronic noncompliance was 40 percent
higher in counties with the highest racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability compared to
counties with the lowest racial, ethnic, and language vulnerability); see also Manju Menon
& Kanchi Kohli, Regulatory Reforms to Address Non-Compliance, CENTER FOR POLICY
RESEARCH (June 7, 2019), https://cprindia.org/policy-challenge/7857/climate-energy-andthe-environment (discussing large-scale legal violations in specific sectors such as
mining).
48
Markell et al., supra note 33, at 581 (pointing to example of enforcement working in
discussing Norway study that found that parties audited by regulators were 37% less likely
to be in noncompliance the following year).
49
Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the
Modern Era, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Intro-FINAL.pdf.
50
See JACK JORDAN ET AL., TACKLING 2020: THE IMPACT OF THE IMO AND HOW
SHIPOWNERS CAN DEAL WITH TIGHTER SULFUR LIMITS 8 (May 2017),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/plattscontent/_assets/_files/en/specialreports/shipping/srtackling-2020-imo-impact-shipowners-tighter-sulfur-limits.pdf (describing that at an
industry conference, more than 30% of respondents to a poll said there would be some degree
of non-compliance in emission control areas in 2020).
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assume that regulated entities relish the opportunity to avoid compliance (and
some likely do), a lack of enforcement also creates uncertainty in the overall
marketplace, which ultimately hurts regulated entities.51 For example, as
EPA’s Deputy Inspector General noted in May 2021, a decline in
environmental enforcement actions means that violators get “an unfair
competitive advantage over other regulated entities that comply with
environmental regulations.”52 Thus, some enforcement regime must exist to
keep noncompliance in check.53
Indeed, most federal statutes with a regulatory focus provide certain
“enforcers” with legal authority to bring environmental enforcement actions.
Federal statutes certainly provide federal and state government enforcers with
authority to bring enforcement actions against regulated entities in order to
obtain injunctive relief and penalties.54 Federal statutes also allow private
individuals to step into the shoes of government enforcers via citizen suits by
bringing enforcement actions against regulated entities in order to obtain
injunctive relief and penalties.55 In addition, federal statutes authorize
administrative enforcement actions through, for example, administrative
hearing officers and administrative law judges.56 Such administrative
environmental enforcement occurs in a variety of administrative court
functions, in front of zoning boards, pollution control boards, water boards,
and others.57 There is indeed plenty of enforcement authority available.
Yet, despite the availability of enforcement authority, it is strikingly
lacking as a tool to deal with noncompliance. For years, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) has discussed concerns over underperformance of
environmental enforcement in the face of significant noncompliance.58 In
51

See, e.g., Emissions Monitoring: Maintaining a Level Playing Field Post-2020,
RIVERIA
NEWSLETTERS
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://www.rivieramm.com/opinion/opinion/emissions-monitoring-maintaining-a-levelplaying-field-post-2020-23341 (“Compliance with the sulphur cap with be challenging
enough in itself, but a further concern involves the competitive advantage gained from illegal
non-compliance”).
52
Kelsey Brugger, Watchdog: Enforcement Inspections, Monitoring Plummeted, E&E
NEWS (May 13, 2021).
53
David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement,
93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2014).
54
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (CAA federal enforcement); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (CWA
federal enforcement); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (RCRA federal enforcement).
55
The “private attorney general” where such individual simulates an attorney general,
acting as the advocate for a group, but solely for a group of private persons.
56
Joseph J. Lisa, EPA Enforcement Actions: An Introduction to the Consolidated Rules
of Practice, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005).
57
See, e.g., Joseph F. Guida & Jean M. Flores, From Here to a Penalty: Anatomy of
EPA Civil Administrative Enforcement, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 129 (2013).
58
David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and
Application: Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 590-91 (2016).
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2016, the OIG specifically noted that “[s]tate enforcement programs are
underperforming: EPA data indicate that noncompliance is high and the level
of enforcement is low.”59 The most recent report by EPA’s Inspector General
in May 2021 found that from 2006 to 2018, EPA's enforcement office
reported a decline in enforcement activities.60 The questions for this article
are why enforcement is deficient and how to strengthen enforcement in the
long-term.
II. HURDLES TO ENFORCEABILITY
This section focuses on existing hurdles in environmental
enforcement. In particular it discusses resource and political, regulatory, and
legal difficulties, as distinct, and also intertwined hurdles to enforceability of
environmental law. The purpose in describing these hurdles is to provide an
overview of the quantity and complexity of issues that must be addressed in
order to achieve long-term and real enforcement.
A. Resource and Political Hurdles
As this article and many others have noted, a very real reason for
enforcement’s lackluster performance is due to resource hurdles.61 For
example, in a specific study on the CAA, Professor Victor Flatt looked at
self-reported compliance data from regulated entities in the early 2000s to
show that state spending per capita directly affects the length of time a
regulated facility is in violation of the CAA.62 In essence, the environmental
enforcement system simply has far too much on its plate to keep up. As noted
by Cynthia Giles, the head of EPA’s enforcement office in the Obama
Administration, “a handful of enforcers will never be able to ensure general
compliance at millions of facilities.”63 As noted by Joel Mintz, a legal scholar
on environmental enforcement, at a 2017 symposium, EPA and the states are
now responsible for regulating a much larger universe of pollution sources
59

Id. at 591.
Kelsey Brugger, Watchdog: Enforcement Inspections, Monitoring Plummeted, E&E
NEWS (May 13, 2021).
61
Jonathan Remy Nash et al., The Production Function of the Regulatory State, How
Much do Agency Budgets Matter?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 695, 709 (2017) (noting that decreased
even though decreases in budgets may not affect environmental quality, they certainly affect
enforcement.
62
Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits:
There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 82
(2009) (looking at).
63
Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance Environmental Regulation for the
Modern Era Part I, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM 3 (2020),
http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cynthia-Giles-Part-1-FINAL.pdf.
60
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than was true in previous years, and in a wider array of new program areas.64
Core functions of enforcement like sending subpoenas, records review, and
inspection, are simply expensive to undertake consistently and
comprehensively.65
Indeed, there are plans for an increased enforcement budget in the
Biden Administration. EPA’s proposed $11.2 billion budget request for fiscal
year 2022, for example, includes plans to “hold bad actors accountable for
their violations, with a particular focus in communities with multiple
pollution sources.”66 Yet EPA, even with increased budgets, relies heavily on
state enforcement activities, and state enforcement budgets have also seen a
significant decline in recent years.67 As described in one study, states bring
about ninety percent of environmental enforcement actions each year, and yet
only eight states had satisfied an EPA goal that all major air pollution emitters
be inspected every two years and only two states had satisfied an EPA goal
that all large-quantity generators of hazardous waste be inspected every five
years.68 Further, given history as a guide, budgets are likely to change again
in the future, meaning that resources will continue to remain a significant
hurdle for effective environmental enforcement.69
Moreover, political hurdles also undoubtedly impede environmental
enforcement policy.70 In the context of enforcement provisions in
environmental permits, EPA has either allowed federal objections to state
permits or disallowed any federal “second-guessing” of state permit terms,
depending on the political administration in power.71 For example, under the
64

DOJ Symposium, The Future of Environmental Enforcement, 47 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,206, 10,209-10 (2017) (remarks by Joel Mintz).
65
Lucas Satterlee, Climate Drones: A New Tool for Oil and Gas Air Emission
Monitoring, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,069 (2016) (discussing drones for use
in enforcement inspections to check compliance with the CAA in the oil and gas sector).
66
FY
2022
EPA
BUDGET
IN
BRIEF
11
(2021),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-05/documents/fy-2022-epa-bib.pdf
67
68

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY-NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, IRREPLACEABLE: WHY
STATES CAN’T AND WON’T MAKE UP FOR INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS 1–2 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/EPA_Enforcement_June2017.pdf.
69
Professor Joel Mintz has also stated “to pursue civil environmental enforcement in an
effective fashion, EPA needs generally adequate budgetary resources and a sufficient number
of qualified enforcement personnel.” DOJ Symposium, supra note 64, at 10,209.
70
See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, PAYING LESS TO POLLUTE: A YEAR
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT
UNDER
TRUMP
(2018),
https://www.environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/EnforcementReport.pdf (discussing changes in environmental enforcement across multiple federal
Administrations).
71
Stuart Parker, EPA Faults Texas Air Permits Amid Looming Fight Over Trump Era
Policy, INSIDEEPA (Aug. 9, 2021), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/epa-faults-texas-airpermits-amid-looming-fight-over-trump-era-policy.
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Obama Administration, EPA’s practice had been to allow objections to state
issued permits, including where the permits had weak enforcement
provisions, such as monitoring and recordkeeping requirements.72 Yet, under
the Trump Administration, EPA established a policy that EPA cannot
“second guess” states’ permitting decisions.73 EPA has also changed its
position across differing federal administrations with regards to remedies
available in enforcement matters, specifically supplemental environmental
projects and mitigation. 74 Other enforcement policies that have changed over
political administrations involve limiting non-criminal enforcement actions
to cases that involve intentional wrongdoing, encouraging restraint in
pursuing criminal charges, and preventing the pursuit of civil penalties in
cases where states had already acted.75
Legal scholarship has certainly acknowledged political hurdles in
environmental enforcement. Professor Mintz has discussed that even though
environmental enforcement should be a professional activity, partisan politics
plays a significant role.76 Professor Cecot has noted that a federal
administration’s particular stance on enforcement, particularly involving
statements of nonenforcement, changes the perceived threat of federal
enforcement thereby impacting state enforcement.77 Professors Outka and
Warner have described the changes in federal initiation of new enforcement
actions, under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump.78 Yet, as Professor Jodi
Short notes, the role of politics features much more prominently in regulatory
scholarship on agenda setting, rulemaking, policy adoption, policy diffusion,
and institutional design, rather than in the area of enforcement and
compliance.79

Stuart Parker, Environmentalists Urge EPA to ‘Disavow’ Trump Title V Air Permit
Policy, INSIDE EPA (Mar. 15, 2021), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/environmentalistsurge-epa-disavow-trump-title-v-air-permit-policy (discussing Texas state permits that have
repeatedly come under attack by environmental groups for failing to include stringent terms,
including enforcement related terms).
73
Id.
74
Akin Gump Enforcement Alert, Tearing Down Trump’s Environmental Wall: Justice
Department Ditches Impediments to Effective Enforcement (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/tearing-down-trumps-enforcement-walljustice-department-ditches-trump-policies-seen-as-impediments-to-enforcement.html.
75
Id.
76
DOJ Symposium, supra note 64, at 10,209 (remarks of Joel Mintz).
77
Caroline Cecot, Filling the Federal Enforcement Gap, 33 NAT. RES. & ENVT. 36
(2019).
78
Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on Environmental Justice
Under the Trump Administration, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 406 (2019).
79
Jodi L. Short, The Politics of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Theorizing
and Operationalizing Political Influences, 15 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 653 (2021).
72
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B. Regulatory Design Hurdles
There has been even less attention to the way in which regulatory
hurdles impact environmental enforcement, Yet, environmental enforcers
also struggle with regulatory hurdles that stem from “flexibility” for regulated
entities. Such flexibility can come in multiple forms, including via providing
exceptions for specific classes of regulated entities and setting pollution
standards that are voluntary rather than numeric.80 Providing flexibility is a
key way in which executive branch agencies reduce the cost for regulated
entities to comply with new environmental regulations.81 Yet, as this section
describes, flexibility in regulatory design hinders enforcement efforts by
requiring enforcers to overcome affirmative defenses raised by regulated
entities early on in litigation proceedings. Thus, while some may focus on the
need for greater resources in order to improve the state of environmental
enforcement, resources alone will not improve the number or value of
remedies actually achieved in enforcement cases. Clear and easy regulatory
defenses simply stand too tall in the enforcer’s path.
As scholars and researchers of administrative law have noted,
exceptions are not really exceptions but instead quite prevalent in regulatory
design.82 For example, the CWA and implementing regulations allow
variances for wastewater dischargers from water quality limits when
compliance might cause “substantial and widespread economic and social
impacts” in communities.83 Additionally, the CAA and its implementing
regulations allow permit exemptions for regulated facilities that may promise
to keep emissions below certain threshold levels.84 At state and local levels,
exemptions are replete in areas of pollution control, particularly as related to
variances from zoning requirements.85
80

Marshal J. Bregar, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TULSA L.J.
325 (1996).
81
GAO FAQs, https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act
(last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (Under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), agencies must
also submit final rules and supporting analyses to the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) for congressional review prior to promulgation. This submission must indicate
whether the rule is “major” as defined under the CRA (5 USC §804(2)), which in general,
involves rules with a $100 million or more impact on the economy).
82
Cary Coglianese et al., Unrules, 73 STAN. L. REV. 883 (2021); see also David Markell
& Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15
(2014) (noting RCRA as an example, where regulatory standards are different between
hazardous waste standard generators and de minims generators).
83
Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R § 131.14.
84
See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Natural Resources. Some facilities or construction projects at
existing facilities may have a low enough environmental impact that they are exempt from
obtaining air pollution permits.
85
Earnhart et al., supra note 40, at 5.
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Exceptions translate into clear affirmative defenses in enforcement
cases. For example, EPA, states, and citizen enforcers grappled with multiple
exceptions in the 2002 new source review regulations that changed permitting
requirements for new and modified large sources of air pollution.86 In
enforcement cases alleging violations of the 2002 regulations, defendants
made regular and far-reaching arguments that modifications made to facilities
fit within the routine exception and hence did not need a permit.87 In one
enforcement case, a coal fired power plant defendant argued that lifeextension modifications that cost millions of dollars were “routine” and hence
justified to fall under the exception.88 In another enforcement case alleging
violations of the 2002 regulations, a coal-fired power plant defendant argued
that all modifications fell within an exception. 89
Moreover, exceptions can embed in compliance determinations,
making it easy for defendants to escape liability. For example, air permits that
set limits for emissions coming from facilities will often exclude emissions
that the facility generates during startup, shutdown, and malfunction periods
of facility operation.90 Such startup, shutdown, and malfunction emissions
can be significant, and simply go unmeasured and unaccounted for in the
permit. In other situations, the way in which facilities measure compliance
can allow for excusable exceedances. A permit may allow a facility that meets
an emission limit ninety five percent of its operating time to be considered
“in compliance.”91 During the other five percent of the time, the facility can
exclude emissions when monitors might be in testing or failure, if there is a
facility upset condition, or the pollution control equipment is going through
cleaning.92 While such “excused” emissions may seem reasonable when
drafting a permit, they often become easy defenses for defendants in
enforcement cases later that allege noncompliance.93
86

67 Fed. Reg. 80,185 (Dec. 31, 2002).
For excellent student note on the routine exception’s implications in enforcement
cases, see Graham Zorn, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Its Routine
Maintenance Exception, 33 VT. L. REV. 783 (2009).
88
Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 1990).
89
United States v. DTE Energy Co., 711 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2013).
90
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Ill. Power Res., LLC, 202 F. Supp. 3d 859, 883–84 (C.D.
Ill. 2016) (pointing out that defendants argued that the vast majority of the exceedances at
issue are excusable under the Illinois SIP because they occurred during periods of
malfunction and breakdown, and noting several other states with similar provisions,
including Georgia and Texas).
91
United States v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 908 F. Supp. 835 (D. Colo. 1995).
92
Id.
93
Sierra Club v. Georgia Power, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (regulated entity
argued that provision of its air pollution permit acknowledging state's enforcement discretion
regarding excess emissions during startup, shutdown, or malfunction was an affirmative
defense available to the plant operator in a citizen suit under Clean Air Act (CAA)).
87
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Moreover, under certain federal environmental laws, once a permit is
issued with or without its flexibilities, a “shield” protects the permit holder
from strict liability for unauthorized discharges. 94 The idea behind a permit
shield is to relieve permit holders of having to litigate in an enforcement
action the question of whether their permits are sufficiently strict.95 The
permit shield defense applies “as long as (1) the permit holder complies with
the express terms of the permit and with the Clean Water Act’s disclosure
requirements and (2) the permit holder does not make a discharge of
pollutants that was not within the reasonable contemplation of the permitting
authority at the time the permit was granted.”96 Thus, if the permit is based
upon accurate information, it is valid. Only if the defendant withheld relevant
information in the permit process would the permit not be valid.97
The permit shield has been a common defense in water permits
involving national water quality standards. For example, in a 2015 district
court case in Georgia, the court ruled that Georgia’s narrative water quality
standards were not incorporated into the Georgia National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued to a pulp mill for
wastewater discharges.98 Plaintiff environmental group argued that the mill’s
discharge had a negative impact on the river, and that the discharge violated
the state’s water quality standards pertaining to color, odor and turbidity.99
The pulp mill’s defense was that the permit did not incorporate water quality
standards, and thus the CWA’s “permit shield” provisions shielded it from
liability under the CWA.100 The court agreed with the pulp mill, granting its
94

NRDC v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1204 (9th Cir. 2013) (if a polluter
holds a water permit, then compliance with the terms of the permit satisfies its obligations
and it cannot be liable for discharges in accordance with the permit); see also CWA 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(k) (compliance with a permit issued shall be deemed compliance for purposes of any
citizen suit or government enforcement action). Note, the CAA also includes permit shields
for permittees. See MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, FACTS ABOUT APPLICATION AND
PERMIT SHIELDS (Mar. 1998), https://www.pca.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/2-04.pdf.
95
Wis. Res. Protection Council v. Flambeau Mining Co., 727 F.3d 700 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
96
Piney Run Preservation Ass’n v. County Commissioners of Carroll County, 268 F.3d
255, 259 (4th Cir. 2001); see also NRDC v. County of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1204
(9th Cir.2013).
97
42 U.S.C. § 7661c(f) (“Compliance with a permit issued in accordance with this
subchapter shall be deemed compliance.”); see also example of state permit shield, WIS.
STAT. § 285.62(10)(b) (“compliance with all emission limitations included in an operation
permit is considered to be compliance with all emission limitations.”).
98
Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC et al., 2018 WL
2947915, Case No. A18A0594 (Ga. App. June 13, 2018).
99
Pulp Mill’s Pollution Discharge Permit Falls Short of Georgia Water Quality
Standards, SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.southernenvironment.org/news-and-press/news-feed/pulp-mill-pollutiondischarge-permit-falls-short-of-georgia-water-quality-s.
100
Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC et al., 2018 WL
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motion for summary judgment on the CWA claims.101 Similarly, in a Sixth
Circuit case in Kentucky, the court found that a permit shield for a mining
company protected the company from liability associated with discharges of
selenium.102 The permit did not specify effluent limitations for selenium and
the discharge resulted in levels exceeding the threshold in the state's water
quality.103 Plaintiffs, a citizen group, argued that the permit shield did not
apply because the discharge of selenium was not expressly authorized by the
permit nor reasonably contemplated by the state agency when it issued the
permit.104 The Sixth Circuit disagreed however, shielding the mining
company from liability.105
Environmental regulations also exempt regulated facilities from
needing permits if the facility only emits “minor” sources of pollution. In
CAA permitting for example, to stay classified as a minor versus major
source a regulated entity only needs to promise to keep the facility’s pollution
under minor source pollution thresholds.106 While it may make sense from a
regulatory perspective to ease permitting burdens for only minor sources of
pollution, it can be difficult for enforcers to monitor whether a facility
actually stays below minor source thresholds.107 In Wild Earth Guardians v.
Extraction Oil and Gas Inc., for example, monitoring and recordkeeping
became a hot issue in litigation where defendants argued that the plaintiff
citizen group enforcers could not demonstrate that the facility had exceeded

2947915, Case No. A18A0594 (Ga. App. June 13, 2018).
101
Id.
102
Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Atl. States
Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding the pollutant
at issue, though not limited by any permit condition, was disclosed and contemplated within
the permitting process, thus implicitly within the permit and thus regulated entity shielded
from liability.); but see Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 990
(9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the argument that water quality standards must be translated into
specific effluent limitations in order to constitute an enforceable requirement of the permit).
106
NPCA v. N.D. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, 945 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 2020) (court upheld
the state agency’s issuance of a permit to a refinery even though it did not include a numeric
cap on hazardous air pollutants because the facility’s potential levels of hazardous air
pollution were below major source thresholds); see also Voigt v. Coyote Creek Mining Co.,
LLC, No. 1:15-CV-00109, 2016 WL 3920045, at *34 (D.N.D. July 15, 2016) (rejecting
argument that a numeric cap was required when determining a source’s potential to emit in
the PSD context).
107
See, e.g., Guidance on Limiting Potential to Emit in New Source Permitting, US EPA,
5–7 (June 13, 1989), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/pte/june13_89.pdf (discussing
enforceability concerns associated with keeping track of minor source thresholds in air
permitting).
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air emission limits without specific monitoring.108 At the same time,
regulated facilities often push back on monitoring requirements as permit
conditions.109
At a broader level, the federal government grapples with concerns
from states that struggle with how to develop enforceable policies and
mechanisms.110 Under the CAA, the federal government sets the standards
and states are required to draft a state implementation plan (“SIP”) for EPA
approval that sets specific measures to achieve the standards, including
through issuance of source-specific permits.111 Similarly, under the CWA,
every state must promulgate water quality standards for EPA approval that
require individual sources to obtain permits.112 State selected implementation
measures, through permits or other specific pollution reducing programs,
must be “enforceable” under both the CAA and CWA.113 Yet courts have
grappled with deciding whether a state pollution reducing measure is
enforceable when relied upon in a state plan to implement a national pollution
standard, particularly if the standard is voluntary.114 For example, in Bayview
Hunters Point Community Advocates v. Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, several environmental groups challenged the inclusion of a
voluntary implementation mechanism in the California SIP for lack of
enforceability as required by the CAA.115 The plan included, as a mechanism
to meet overall air quality standards in the San Francisco area, the anticipated
reductions in emissions resulting from a 15% “target” public transportation

108

WildEarth Guardians v. Extraction Oil and Gas Inc., 457 F. Supp. 3d 936, 961–62
(D. Colo. 2020).
109
In re Limetree Bay Refining and Limetree Bay Terminals (2021 case pending with
Environmental Appeals Board involving oil refiner challenge to EPA’s issuance of an air
permit that requires general air monitoring to ensure compliance with national ambient air
quality standards).
110
Memorandum from Peyton Robertson, Water Quality Specialist, NOAA, to State
Coastal Nonpoint Program Coordinators, Enforceable Policies and Mechanisms for State
Coastal
Nonpoint
Source
Programs
(Jan.
23,
2001),
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/czm/pollutioncontrol/media/epmmemo.pdf (noting desire to
work with states in proving flexibility for voluntary programs to qualify as enforceable).
111
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k).
112
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
113
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
114
Kenneth J. Adler et al., Using an Emissions Banking and Trading Program to Reduce
Diesel Emissions, 49 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 183 (2019) (noting that mobile sources have not
typically been included in state NOx emissions trading programs (like Texas Commission
for Environmental Quality’s (TCEQ) Emissions Banking and Trading (EBT) program)
because of the difficulty in tracking their location and accurately quantifying potential
emission reductions).
115
Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates v. Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, 366 F. 3d 692 (9th Cir. 2004).
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ridership increase.116 The Ninth Circuit found that nothing in the
transportation control measure's language actually required a ridership
increase by any amount, and that instead the expected ridership increase was
simply a target, not a promise to attain a ridership increase. 117 The ridership
target relied on “hoped-for increases in productivity” to boost public transit
use, but because predicting public behavior is unreliable, the Court found that
the measure was unenforceable and therefore did not comply with the
CAA.118 By contrast, other cases have found that similar voluntary measures
in a SIP do meet the CAA’s requirement of enforceability. In BCCA Appeal
Group v. U.S. EPA, the Fifth Circuit found that a SIP that simply promised
to make real reductions in the future, without actually specifying particular
control measures, was good enough to qualify as enforceable and therefore
did not violate the CAA’s requirements.119 The Fifth Circuit looked to EPA’s
own interpretation of the CAA allowing limited use of other “means” and
“techniques,” like future promises, so long as the entire package of measures
and rules provides for attainment of air quality standards, and the state is
capable of fulfilling its promise.120 Similarly, in Committee for a Better
Arvin, et al., v. U.S. EPA, the Ninth Circuit found that California’s SIP,
relying on a promise by the state to achieve certain emission reductions in the
future, was enough to meet enforceability requirements.121 The Ninth Circuit
distinguished Committee for a Better Arvin from Bayview Hunters Point
Community Advocates, finding that because state commitments to propose
and adopt emission control measures required government agency action
rather than action by the public, the measures were enforceable.122
Moreover, even when pollution standards are required, sometimes
they are simply too vague for enforcers. Under the CAA, for a permit
condition to be considered “enforceable as a practical matter,” it must include
specific criteria such as “applicability, compliance date, specificity of
conduct, any incorporation by reference, recordkeeping requirements, and
116

Id.
Id.
118
Bayview, 366 F.3d at 698.
119
BCCA Appeal Group v. U.S. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2003).
120
Id. (citing to EPA Final Rule Approving Texas SIP, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,160, 57,177
(Nov. 14, 2001)). The court referred to EPA’s three factor test in determining whether to
approve a SIP’s enforceable commitment: (1) whether the commitment addresses a limited
portion of the SIP; (2) whether the state generally considers is capable of fulfilling its
commitment; and (3) whether the commitment is for a reasonable and appropriate period of
time.
121
Comm. for a Better Arvin v. U.S. EPA, 786 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014), a group of
environmental and community groups brought a challenge against the State of California for
relying on unenforceable measures to meet air quality standards for the San Joaquin valley,
an area with some of the worst air quality in the country.
122
Id. at 1180.
117
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exemptions and exceptions.”123 In cases brought by EPA to enforce air permit
limits, regulated entities have argued as a defense that the limit is not
enforceable as a practical matter because it is too vague.124 In NPCA v.
NDEQ, however, the state Supreme Court of North Dakota held that an
emission limit for a refinery did not need to be numeric in order to still be
enforceable.125 The court based its reasoning on the fact that nothing in
applicable state or federal law required the state to specify a numeric cap for
a limit.126 Similarly, under the CWA, water quality standards can be either
narrative or numeric.127 Indeed, some scholars have argued for the adoption
of numeric water quality criteria as preferable to narrative criteria, which are
vaguer and less susceptible to enforcement.128
Moreover, new environmental regulations can face opposition at the
outset due to concerns that such new regulations will require more resources
to enforce. This issue arose in arguments made by the state of Colorado in a
2020 case before the Tenth Circuit regarding EPA’s Navigable Waters
Protection regulation.129 In its request that the court enjoin EPA from
implementing the new regulation, the state of Colorado presented increased
enforcement burden as evidence of harm. In particular, the state’s clean water
program manager asserted that implementation of the regulation would
require Colorado to eventually take enforcement action, and because the state
lacked dedicated funding to undertake such an enforcement effort, the state
would have to divert resources from other clean water programs to the
detriment of those programs.130 While the court found the testimony by the
program manager to be lacking in specificity, and as a result, found
insufficient evidence for the state to demonstrate harm, it is indicative of the
very real need for consideration of the availability of state enforcement
budgets and resources in new federal regulations.131 In another example,
multiple state agencies fought against the 2002 CAA new source review
proposed regulation, arguing in part that the regulation’s weak recordkeeping
requirements for regulated entities would hinder enforcement efforts by
increasing the burden on states.132
123

54 Fed. Reg. 27,274, 27,283 (June 26, 1989).
United States v. EKPC, 498 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
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NPCA v. N.D. Dep’t of Envtl Quality, 945 N.W.2d 318 (N.D. 2020).
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Id. at 27, 30.
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40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2002).
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Julie Furr Youngman, Water, Water, Anywhere?: Protecting Water Quantity in State
Water Quality Standards, 94 IND. L.J. 1613 (2019).
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State v. U.S. EPA, 2021 WL 790999 (10th Cir. 2021).
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Id. at *7.
131
Id. at *8 (to constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be imminent, certain, actual
and not speculative).
132
New Jersey v. EPA, 989 F.3d 1038 (2021).
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C. Legal Hurdles
In addition to regulatory hurdles, certain legal arguments also present
difficulties for environmental enforcers. In particular, the doctrines of
preclusion and preemption pose significant legal hurdles for environmental
enforcers. Defendants typically raise both of these arguments as affirmative
defenses in environmental enforcement litigations.133 First, defendants will
argue that preclusion prevents enforcers from bringing an enforcement action
because of a prior resolved enforcement case involving the same issue.
Second, defendants will argue that preemption prevents enforcers from
bringing an enforcement case because a higher authority of law exists that
conflicts with the enforcement action, thereby displacing the action.
Preclusion arguments can be raised in a number of contexts. Several
environmental statutes preclude citizen enforcement actions when a state has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a comparable state
law in court.134 Some federal statutes also provide that prior state
administrative enforcement actions can bar the filing of a citizen suit
addressing the same violations. Preclusion arguments most commonly arise
with citizen suit enforcers.135 However, government enforcers can also face
preclusion defenses136 For example, under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), federal enforcers have faced preclusion issues when
a state has reached agreement on its own enforcement action.137 In Harmon
Industries, the Eighth Circuit found that the plain language of the RCRA
showed a congressional intent for an authorized state program to supplant the

133

An affirmative defense to a civil lawsuit or criminal charge is a fact or set of facts
other than those alleged by the plaintiff, which, if proven by the defendant, defeats or
mitigates the legal consequences of the defendant’s otherwise unlawful conduct.
134
In general, citizens are precluded from filing a suit if the EPA or State has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States a pollution standard at issue in the citizen suit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8(b)(1)(B) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(2) (CERCLA); 42
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(B) (TSCA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046(e), (h)(2) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act).
135
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Two Elk Generation Partners, 646 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2011)
(finding a CAA citizen suit action precluded under the common law doctrine of issue
preclusion); Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d
743 (7th Cir. 2004) (considering the doctrine of claim preclusion in a CWA citizen suit
action)
136
See generally William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFFS. L. REV. 199 (1988) (discussing preclusion
in government enforcement cases in RCRA and other federal environmental statutes).
137
See, e.g., Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999).
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federal hazardous waste program in all respects, including enforcement.138
The defendant in that case challenged EPA’s claims by arguing that EPA was
barred from suing because the state had begun its own action against the
defendant.139 The defendant had already reached a settlement agreement,
later approved by a state court, under which the defendant would clean up the
relevant disposal area and pay no fine.140 While it was implementing the
cleanup, EPA initiated an enforcement action against it under the RCRA,
seeking over $2 million in penalties.141 After litigating EPA’s claim through
an administrative law judge and federal district court, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that EPA was barred from
initiating an independent action against an alleged violator of RCRA that had
been the subject of a state enforcement action.142
Enforcers, particularly at the state and local level, also grapple with
preemption arguments when pursuing environmental enforcement actions.143
In recent years, preemption has been particularly difficult for state and local
government enforcers when attempting to enforce environmental regulations
on natural gas pipelines.144 In one federal district court case, a natural gas
company sought declaratory judgment and an injunction against a town’s
enforcement of its zoning ordinance through denial of a building permit.145
The company argued that without a permit, the town could issue a stop work
order with potential penalties and jail time for violating the zoning
ordinance.146 The court agreed, finding that the town’s zoning regulations
conflicted with the determination approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC).147 In another similar federal district court case, a
natural gas company sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against
138

Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999).
Id.
140
The facts of Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir.1999)
involved maintenance workers discarding solvent residue outside one of the plaintiff's plants
for many years.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
In general, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power
to preempt state law and an agency’s preemption regulations, have the same preemptive
effect as statutes. See Choate v. Champion Home Builders, Co., 222 F.3d 788, 791–92 (10th
Cir. 2000). Federal preemption occurs where Congress defines explicitly the extent to which
its enactment preempts state laws, when state law “regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively, and when it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements. See also English v. General
Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
144
See, e.g., Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y.
2020); Islander Pipeline Co. LLC v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Conn. 2007).
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Empire Pipeline v. Town of Pendleton, 472 F. Supp. 3d 25 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
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Id.
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Id.
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the state of Connecticut to obtain relief from the requirement that it obtain a
state permit under the state’s Structures, Dredging and Fill Act for
construction activities related to an interstate natural gas pipeline.148 The
court held that allowing the state of Connecticut to enforce a sedimentsampling requirement for construction activities, and then potentially deny
the company’s permit application, would pose a significant obstacle to the
pipeline project, thereby colliding with the Natural Gas Act.149 Other federal
court cases are contending with the ability of a state government to enforce
state water permits given the Natural Gas Act’s carve out for the rights of
states to administer CWA water certification programs for discharges into
navigable waters.150
In addition to natural gas pipelines, railway expansion is another area
with significant pollution consequences that is prone to preemption of local
government environmental enforcement.151 For example, in Grafton & Upton
RR Co. v. Town of Milford, a local government dealt with a challenge to its
efforts to enforce zoning restrictions on preemption grounds. 152 In that case,
the local government informed a railroad company that it intended to file a
petition with the Surface Transportation Board (STB) seeking a declaratory
order that the railroad company’s proposed development of an old rail yard
was prohibited by the town’s zoning law.153 The railroad company filed an
action in federal court to enjoin the local government from taking any action
to enforce its zoning law, arguing that federal interstate commerce law
preempted any state or municipal statute, ordinance, or regulation supporting
a delay or prohibition on the railroad’s proposed development.154 The town
tried to argue that the proposed development was not for transportation
purposes, but rather only for related train functions more akin to those of a
trucking company, thereby eliminating any conflict between the federal law
and the state zoning law.155 However, the court found that the relevant federal
statute, the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, indicates an
express intent on the part of Congress to preempt the entire field of railroad
148

Islander Pipeline Co. LLC v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Conn. 2007).
Id. at 294.
150
See generally Millennium Pipeline Co. LLC, v. Seggos, 288 F. Supp. 3d 530
(N.D.N.Y. 2017).
151
See, e.g., Ass’n of American Railroads v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622
F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (local government regulation limiting permissible amount of
emissions from idling trains, imposing reporting requirements, backed by threat of penalties,
on railyard operators, preempted by federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act).
152
Grafton & Upton RR Co. v. Town of Milford, 337 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2014).
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Id.
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regulation, including activities related to but not directly involving railroad
transportation.156 Thus, the court held that the local government’s
enforcement of its zoning regulations would interfere with the proposed
interstate rail operations.157
Preemption hurdles arise in multiple other contexts for local
government agencies trying to enforce existing pollution laws. In Texas, a
court found that the state air and water pollution laws preempted a local
government’s ordinance, even though the local government enacted the
ordinance because it felt that the state’s enforcement of its pollution laws was
too lax.158 In a Nebraska case, a state court found a city’s ordinance banning
landfills within 5 miles of the city’s drinking water supply unenforceable
against a county government’s solid waste disposal site because a state statute
preempted the city’s ordinance.159 However, in New Hampshire, the state
Supreme Court found that state solid waste statutes did not completely
preempt the field of solid waste management and that a town’s local
ordinance regarding the location of a landfill was not preempted.160
Lastly, legal hurdles for enforcement can also arise from some of the
resource hurdles discussed above. The unavailability of enforcement officials
to find violations in a timely matter means cases may become stale or face
statute of limitations defenses by regulated entities. In one CWA enforcement
case, for example, government plaintiffs alleged over one hundred violations
at one Texas aluminum plant based on self-reported discharge monitoring
reports (DMR) from the defendant corporate owner.161 The defendant raised
a statute of limitations defense, arguing in part that the government plaintiffs
should have known of the violations because EPA has the right to inspect
permitted facilities. The court specifically noted that EPA region covering
Texas and other neighboring states receives over 14,000 such similar DMR’s
each month, and has limited resources with which to perform inspections of
permit holders’ facilities. Thus, the court held that even though EPA had the
right to inspect the aluminum plant at any time under the CWA, a belief that
EPA should have done so did not “correspond with reality.”162
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Boston & Maine Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 330 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that
“in order to be permissible under the ICCTA, state and local regulations applied to the
development of an automobile unloading facility must not interfere with interstate rail
operations).
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See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
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2004).
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III. CASE STUDY: VEHICLE TAMPERING
This section uses enforcement of air pollution regulations that
prohibit tampering with emission control devices on motor vehicles as a case
study to demonstrate the ways in which legal hurdles in environmental
enforcement manifest in one particular fact pattern. It highlights tampering in
particular because of the plethora of enforcement activity happening
currently, and in particular the issues pending related to preemption,
exceptions, and resources.
A. Regulations and Compliance
EPA promulgates emissions standards for specific air pollutants
emitted by vehicles and engines introduced into United States commerce. To
ensure that every vehicle and engine introduced into commerce satisfies
emissions standards, EPA administers a certification program.163 Vehicle
manufacturers apply for a certificate, and in these applications must describe
specific elements of design to meet relevant emission standards.164 Design
features may include, for example, fueling strategies, ignition timing, exhaust
gas recirculation systems, filters, and catalysts.165 The CAA also explicitly
prohibits any person from removing any device or element of design installed
on or in a vehicle or engine prior to its sale or knowingly removing any such
element of design after a sale.166 Thus, the regulations employ, as this article
describe in Table 1 above, features of what administrative law scholars would
call both a design-based standard and a prohibition.
In order to demonstrate compliance with emission standards, vehicle
and engine manufacturers must obtain a certificate from EPA for new fleets
of vehicles coming into the market.167 A certificate demonstrates that the
respective engine or vehicle conforms to all of the applicable emission
163
Memorandum from Susan Bodine, Ass’t Adm’r for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, EPA Tampering Policy: The EPA Enforcement Policy on Vehicle and Engine
Tampering and Aftermarket Defeat Devices under the Clean Air Act 3 (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/documents/epatamperingpolicyenforcementpolicyonvehicleandenginetampering.pdf.
164
Id.
165
Letter from Evan Belser, Dep. Dir. Air Enforcement Div. EPA to Jason E. Sloan,
Exec. Dir. Ass’n of Air Pollution Control Agencies et al., Tampered Diesel Pickup Trucks:
A Review of Aggregated Evidence from EPA Civil Enforcement Investigations (Nov. 20,
2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/202101/documents/epaaedletterreportontampereddieselpickups.pdf.
166
CAA § 203(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A), 40 C.F.R. § 1068.101(b)(1).
167
42 U.S.C. § 7521 (EPA administers a certificate of conformity (“COCs”) program to
ensure that every new motor vehicle introduced into United States commerce satisfies
applicable emission standards).
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requirements.168 An aftermarket part with a principal effect of bypassing,
defeating, or rendering inoperative any aspect of these elements might be
considered an illegal aftermarket defeat device.169 To obtain a certificate, a
manufacturer must submit an application to EPA for each model year and for
each test group of new motor vehicles that it wants to be able to sell into
commerce.170 EPA regulations also require periodic “in-use” testing of
vehicles, which requires manufacturers to periodically test a specified
number of vehicles and report the results of those tests to EPA.171 EPA uses
such testing and reporting to watch for noncompliance.172
The CAA’s prohibition on removing elements of design is trickier to
monitor. Each certificate application from a manufacturer must include,
among other things, a list of all auxiliary emission control device (AECDs)
installed on the motor vehicles.173 An AECD is an element of design that
senses a parameter, like temperature or vehicle speed, and then changes part
of the emission control system.174 The tricky thing is that EPA regulations
allow AECDs when there is a specific justification for its use. 175 It is only
when an AECD specifically disables emissions controls under real-world
driving conditions, even if the vehicle passes formal emissions certificate or
in-use testing, that the law prohibits AECDs.176 Such prohibited AECDs are
defeat devices.177 As Richard Epstein wrote in a Forbes article, enforcement
168

Overview of Certification and Compliance, US EPA, https://www.epa.gov/vecertification/overview-certification-and-compliance-vehicles-and-engines (last visited Sept.
17, 2021) (The certificate represents engines and vehicles covered by a specific engine
family or, in the case of light-duty vehicles, a specific test group for each manufacturer).
169
Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163.
170
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 86.1803-01, 86.1827-01 (A test group is comprised of motor
vehicles with similar engine design and subject to the same emission standards for pollutants
regulated under the Act).
171
EPA Requirements for In-Use Emissions Testing for Clean Diesel Technology, U.S.
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/verified-diesel-tech/requirements-use-emissions-testing-cleandiesel-technology (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
172
Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163.
173
40 C.F.R. § 86.1844-01(d)(11) (each as well as a justification for each AECD, the
parameters they sense and control, a detailed justification of each AECD that results in a
reduction in effectiveness of the emission control system, and a rationale for why it is not a
defeat device).
174
40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01.
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40 C.F.R. § 86.1803-01 (A “defeat device” is an AECD that “reduces the
effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions which may reasonably be
expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use, unless: (1) Such conditions
are substantially included in the Federal emission test procedure; (2) The need for the AECD
is justified in terms of protecting the vehicle against damage or accident; (3) The AECD does
not go beyond the requirements of engine starting; or (4) The AECD applies only for
emergency vehicle.”).
176
40 C.F.R. § 86.004-2.
177
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A).
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of unauthorized AECDs and defeat devices is hard because the regulatory
system primarily looks at how vehicles are made and used, and as a result,
responsibility involves multiple parties, including the automaker, the owner,
third party drivers, dealers, and other parties.178
B. Noncompliance and Enforcement
Noncompliance with the CAA’s defeat device regulations made
national headlines in 2015 with the Volkswagen diesel emission scandal.179
That infamous case involved a large original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
installing defeat devices in the computer program of several classes of new
vehicles.180 The United States has also brought multiple other enforcement
cases involving OEMs that installed defeat devices in a vehicle’s computer
system, including against Fiat-Chrystler, Daimler, and Mercedes-Benz.181
There has been less public attention, however, towards aftermarket cases
involving individuals, repair shops, and sellers of defeat devices tampering
with emissions controls on existing vehicles. This type of tampering includes
reprograming original engine software to override the diagnostic system so a
tampered vehicle can run without diagnostic check, installing hardware
designed to defeat emissions controls, or replacing original exhaust systems
with hollow straight pipes.182
There are multiple reasons for tampering with emissions controls in
the aftermarket context. Emissions control devices affect engine performance
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Richard Epstein, The Role of Defeat Devices in Environmental Protection: Beyond
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Scandal,
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27,
2017),
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Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772. Also, note, the EPA has long taken
enforcement cases against manufactures for installing defeat devices. See, e.g., United States
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2002); EPA, Clean Air Act Prohibits “Defeat
Devices” in Vehicles, Engines,
ENFORCEMENT ALERT (Aug. 1998),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/defeat.pdf
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enforcement actions brought against Honda and Ford in 1996 and 1997 for equipping
vehicles with defeat devices).
180
Learn About Volkswagen Violations, US EPA, https://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-aboutvolkswagen-violations (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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Daimler AG and Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC Clean Air Act Civil Settlement, US EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/daimler-ag-and-mercedes-benz-usa-llc-clean-air-actcivil-settlement (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Clean Air Act Civil
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(Jan.
10,
2019),
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by increasing fuel consumption, thereby reducing fuel economy.183
Tampering also avoids cost and time to maintain emissions controls.184
Further, tampering allows vehicle owners to customize their cars.185 Despite
the relative lack of attention it receives, aftermarket noncompliance by
existing vehicles is also a rampant problem in the United States.186 Thus,
EPA’s enforcement office made aftermarket defeat devices a formal
compliance priority initiative during the Trump Administration that
continues today.187 As one law firm blog notes, even during the pandemic,
EPA resolved more than twenty aftermarket “defeat device” and tampering
enforcement cases.188
Widespread tampering and noncompliance has significant
implications for achievement of the expected benefit from environmental
regulations. As stated by EPA, tampering disrupts engine calibration and
balance, which increases emissions of harmful air pollutants.189 Tampering
with diesel-powered engines is particularly prevalent and problematic. EPA
estimated in a 2020 report that prohibited tampering with emissions controls
accounts for more than 570,000 excess tons of NOx and 5,000 tons of PM,
significantly contributing to the inability of many states to attain national air
quality standards.190 The report also found that fifteen percent of all dieselfueled pickup trucks – about 550,000 – have been tampered with over the
past decade, resulting in more than 570,000 tons of excess NOx.191 In the midAtlantic states, around 8.5% of all diesel vehicles registered in Mid Atlantic
Regional Air Management Association (MARAMA) states have had their
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Sept. 17, 2021).
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emissions controls “deleted” between 2009-2019. That is the equivalent
60,000 tons of excess NOx above expected levels.192
C. Resource, Regulatory, and Legal Hurdles
The multitude of both distinct and intertwined hurdles, as described
in this article, present significant obstacles for aftermarket tampering
enforcers. The federal government has made progress on improving
enforcement, but it cannot do it all. State enforcement agencies are starting
to increase activity to regulate aftermarket tampering as well.193 Indeed, many
states have laws prohibiting tampering with in-use vehicles,194 and some
states also prohibit dealers from selling tampered in-use vehicles.195
However, various enforcement hurdles have limited the effectiveness of these
recent efforts to address vehicle tampering.
Government bodies seeking to enforce vehicle tampering violations,
particularly at the state level, face a number of resource hurdles. It is difficult
for states to prioritize resources towards tampering enforcement when there
is no “credit” available in EPA approval of SIPs.196 In general, states have
Mid-Atlantic Regional Air Management Ass’n, Whitepaper on Tampering and After
Market Defeat Devices: An Analysis of Mid-Atlantic State Compliance and Enforcement
Options (2020), https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/Air/MobileSources/Documents/AntiTampering/TamperingWhitePaper.pdf.
193
See, e.g., Enforcement Alert: Tampering of Emission Control Systems on Diesel and
Gasoline Vehicles Is Prohibited, N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL PROTECTION (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/advisories/2017-08.pdf.
194
See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.307-201-4 (“No person shall remove or make
inoperable the [emissions control] system or device or any part thereof, except for the
purpose of installing another system or device, or part thereof, which is equally or more
effective in reducing emissions from the vehicle to the atmosphere.”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 7:27-15.7 (prohibition of tampering with emission control apparatus); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 13, § 2711(e) (No person shall alter, physically disable, disconnect, bypass, or tamper
with an installed ARB verified diesel emission control strategy.”); 326 IND. ADMIN. CODE
§ 13-2.1-3(a)(2) (“No person shall cause, suffer, allow, or permit the removal, dismantling,
disconnection, disabling, or disrepair of any emission control system which has been
installed on a motor vehicle by the manufacturer . . . .”).
195
See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:27-15.7(a)(3–3) (prohibiting the “sale, lease, or offer
for sale or lease” of tampered vehicles); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.16(B)(1) (“No
personal shall . . . sell, offer for sale, possess for sale, advertise, manufacture, install, or use
any part or component intended for use with or as part of any motor vehicle when the primary
effect is to bypass, defeat, or render inoperative, in whole or part, the emission control system
. . . .”); 326 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 13-2.1-3(a)(1), (3) (“No person shall rent, lease, sell, offer
for sale, or in any manner transfer ownership of a motor vehicle with knowledge that the
vehicle has been subject to tampering. . . . No person shall sell, offer for sale, or advertise
for sale any add-on part or modified part which inhibits the effectiveness or bypasses an
emission control system. . . .”). See also Memorandum from Susan Bodine, supra note 163.
196
Letter from David P. Howekamp, Dir., Air Division, EPA, to Richard Somerville,
192
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not received credit for tampering enforcement matters because of concerns
about whether such enforcement can provide real pollution reductions that
help the state achieve national air quality standards.197 Instead, EPA grants
SIP credit for mobile emissions reductions on a case-by-case basis.198 While
EPA grants SIP credits to states for adopting specified inspection and
maintenance program features (like taking a car in for regular emissions
testing), EPA does not require states to incorporate anti-tampering laws into
their SIPs.199 Thus, the lack of credit in the SIP process for state tampering
efforts impedes state enforcement activity.200 Moreover, given federal
enforcement measures to address such tampering, some states view statespecific tampering enforcement as unnecessary and redundant.201
Additionally, state enforcers have been confronted with a number of
legal hurdles when addressing vehicle tampering. While the CAA prohibits
states and localities from “adopting or attempting to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” it also reserves
to states and localities the right to control, regulate, or restrict the use,
operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles. 202 Such
Air Pollution Control Officer, San Diego County, EPA Guidance Letter on Mobile Source
Emission
Reduction
Credits
2
(Mar.
14,
2000),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/otaymesa.pdf.
197
Kenneth J. Adler et al., Using an Emissions Banking and Trading Program to Reduce
Diesel Emissions: A Case Study in Houston, 49 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 183 (2019) (describing
that movement of the pollution source makes it difficult to track and enforce and hence
programs to reduce diesel emissions from tug-boats have not received credit in SIP’s and in
similar credit banking programs in Houston Texas).
198
Letter from David P. Howekamp, supra note 196, at 2.
199
EPA’s Menu of Control Measures does not include any specific mention of antitampering measures, beyond those incorporated into I/M programs. See EPA, Menu of
Control
Measures
(updated
Apr.
12,
2012),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/menuofcontrolmeasures.pdf
200
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Control of Air Pollution from Motor Vehicle Transportation
by the Federal and State Governments, 2000A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11, at § 11-3
(2000) (Developing a Motor Vehicle Emissions Control Program As Part of a State
Implementation Plan) (describing that states that need reduction measures to meet SIP
revision requirements have a strong incentive to get the reductions).
201
See Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, Interoffice Memorandum on SIP Revision to
Remove Anti-tampering and EAC LIRAP Non-Rule Project No. 2018-006-SIP-NR, (2018),
https://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/implementation/air/sip/mobile/2018_AntiTamperi
ng_EAC-LIRAP/18006SIP_AntiTamperEACLIRAP_ado.pdf.
202
CAA § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543. See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Ass’n, 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (explaining that “standard” under § 209 “relate[s] to the
emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine” and finding state regulations equivalent to
functionally enforcing a “standard” preempted); Jackson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F. Supp.
2d 570, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[Section] 209(a)’s language unambiguously and expressly
preempts state common law tort actions, provided that they ‘relate to’ the control of
emissions.”); Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.
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language in the statute has required states and local government enforcers to
thread the needle in deciding which enforcement cases to pursue.203
Indeed, Volkswagen in January 2021 petitioned the Supreme Court to
overturn a ruling by the Ninth Circuit that allowed counties to bring
additional defeat device claims against the company after finding that the
CAA did not preempt such claims.204 In the aftermath of the Volkswagen
diesel emission scandal, two local governments, one in Florida and another
in Utah, brought enforcement cases against Volkswagen, alleging violation
of state and local anti-tampering laws involving the installation of defeat
devices.205 While initially the claims focused on VW’s pre-sale installation
of defeat devices, after a district court decision found Wyoming’s claim
against VW preempted,206 the local government plaintiffs from Florida and
Utah amended their complaints to focus on aftermarket software updates.207
Nonetheless, the Northern District of California dismissed the local
government Florida and Utah enforcement cases.208 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed finding that state and county actions relating to
Volkswagen’s post-sale actions were neither expressly or impliedly
preempted under the CAA.209 In Volkswagen’s petition for certiorari, it
argued that state and local governments’ attempts to enforce their own
tampering regulations are preempted because those regulations relate back to
April 10, 1972), aff’d, 468 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The preemption sections, however, do
not preclude a state or locality from imposing its own exhaust emission control standards
upon the resale or reregistration of the automobile. Nor do they preclude a locality from
setting its own standards for the licensing of vehicles for commercial use within that
locality.”).
203
See, e.g., In re Office of Attorney General of State of New York, 268 A.D. 2d 1, 11
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (In pursuing the common-law claims, the Attorney General is not, as
he suggests, attempting to enforce an existing State standard or pursue a simple commonlaw claim but, rather, is seeking to use this State's common law to penalize the manufacturers
for producing engines which failed to comply with the Federal standards promulgated
pursuant to the CAA. In doing so, the Attorney General is attempting to enforce those
standards, and we now find that he is expressly preempted from pursuing those claims.”).
204
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Volkswagen Group of America et al., v. The Envt’l
Protection Comm’n of Hillsborough County, Florida et al., No. 20-994 (S. Ct. Jan. 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20994/166902/20210121145114485_Volkswagen%20Petition.pdf
205
See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
264 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1052–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Note, both the Utah and Florida cases
were consolidated with actions brought by a number of other states and counties, including
Wyoming, in the Northern District of California.
206
See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.
264 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1052–57 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
207
See In Re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 18-15937, at 16–17 (9th Cir. 2020).
208
See id.
209
See id.
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the original design of the engine by the original manufacturer.210 Such a
drawn-out saga regarding the preemption issue will likely have a chilling
effect on state and local government enforcement related to defeat device
cases in the aftermarket context as well.
Moreover, state and local government enforcement will be important
to support federal enforcement efforts, particularly because citizen suit
enforcement authority for defeat device cases is questionable. There have
been some recent challenges calling into question the use of citizen suits to
enforce Title II’s anti-tampering provisions. Recently, in Utah Physicians for
a Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, defendant retailers of aftermarket
automotive parts challenged whether the CAA’s anti-tampering regulations
are “emissions standards or limitations” under the Title II citizen suit
provision.211 By reading “emission standards or limitations” as separate and
distinct from “prohibited acts,” TAP alleged that Title II citizen suits can only
concern violations of an “objective measurement of air pollution
emissions.”212 Thus, TAP argued, any citizen suits concerning anti-tampering
violations are beyond the scope of Title II’s citizen suit provision.213 Plaintiff,
however, contended that since the purpose of in-use anti-tampering
provisions is “to limit the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air
pollutants,” such provisions function as “emission standards” in
application.214 Ultimately, a ruling in TAP’s favor would dramatically narrow
the scope of the citizen suit provision and further restrict efforts to enforce
anti-tampering provisions.
Then there are exceptions that impede aftermarket tampering
enforcement cases. EPA regulations include a “racecar exemption” under
which vehicles whose engines are modified for solely for competitive use are
exempted from anti-tampering prohibitions.215 While vehicles modified for
racing are lawful when used at the track, they are illegal when driven on
public roads.216 The exemption complicates tampering enforcement, as
purchasers and sellers of defeat devices for on-road vehicles may circumvent
210

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 204, at 25–26.
See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 11, Utah Physicians for a
Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan. 1, 2020).
212
See Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 11, Utah Physicians for a
Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan. 1, 2020).
213
Id.
214
Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11–12, Utah
Physicians for a Healthy Environment v. TAP Worldwide, No. 2:19-cv-00628 (D. Utah Jan.
31, 2020)
215
40 C.F.R. § 1068.235(b).
216
Id. (“This exemption applies only to the prohibitions in § 1068.101(b)(1) and (2) and
are valid only as long as the engine/equipment is used solely for competition.”) (emphasis
added).
211
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the tampering prohibition simply by claiming a tampered vehicle was
modified for use on the track.217 EPA attempted to address this anomaly in
2015 and sought to amend the racecar exemption to clarify that “nonroad
engines and vehicles” are defined by the physical characteristics of the
vehicle—those which make the vehicle suitable for racing—rather than by
the vehicles use in racing.218 In light of severe pushback from motorsports
trade associations, EPA abandoned this effort in 2016, but since then has
continued to assert that vehicles converted for use exclusively for competition
are still subject to CAA enforcement.219 A district court opinion in a 2021
EPA enforcement case exemplifies the role of the racing exception in
enforcement, stating “much ink has been spilled already in this case regarding
whether a motorsports exception, or exclusion, exists in the C.A.A.”220
Additionally, while not a formal exception, EPA’s guidance has long stated
that the agency would exercise enforcement discretion in the context of
aftermarket part manufacture, sale, and installation where the individual has
a “reasonable basis” that the conduct will not adversely affect emissions.221
Such reasonable basis consideration is getting prime attention by regulated
entities and law firm counsel for future defenses in enforcement cases.222
III. IDENTIFYING “ENFORCEABILITY”

217
Roy Furchgott, Crackdown on Emissions Defeat Devices Has Amateur Racers Up in
Arms, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/business/defeatdevices-clean-air-act.html.
218
EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,138, 40,527
(proposed July 13, 2015).
219
EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 80 Fed. Reg. 73478, 73,957
(Oct. 25 2016) (“EPA’s focus is not . . . on vehicles built or used exclusively for racing, but
on companies that violate the rules by making and selling products that disable pollution
controls on motor vehicles and public roads. . . . Since our attempt to clarify led to confusion,
EPA has decided to eliminate the proposed language from the final rule.”).
220
Furchgott, supra note 217.
221
See, e.g., Lisa Whitley Coleman, EPA Issues Enforcement Alert on Emissions
Tampering,
EHS
DAILY
ADVISOR
(Mar.
2,
2021),
https://ehsdailyadvisor.blr.com/2021/03/epa-issues-enforcement-alert-on-emissionstampering/ (referring to “reasonable basis” as a defense); Peter A. Tomasi, EPA Issues
Revised Anti-Tampering Policy, FOLEY LAW FIRM BLOG (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/12/epa-revised-anti-tamperingenforcement-policy#:~:text=. EPA has stated that the Tampering Policy is used in exercising
enforcement discretion in civil actions.
222
See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 221 (referring to “reasonable basis” as a defense);
Tomasi, supra note 221.
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This section suggests that despite the frequent use of the term
“enforceable” in environmental regulation, the term ultimately lacks
meaningful substance due to the numerous hurdles that chip away at the
actual ability to enforce. It provides an overview of where and how the term
comes up in environmental law. It then argues for a more consistent and clear
use of the term that reflects the reality for enforcers.
A. Costs of Continued Failure to Recognize Hurdles
All hurdles to enforcement will not and should not go away. The
preemption doctrine, rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, promotes national uniformity in regulations.223 The preclusion
doctrine helps avoid jurisdictional strife and duplicative litigation.224
Political hurdles allow duly elected Administrations to shape their own
enforcement policy. Even resource hurdles have value in a world in which
there is a need for government agencies and citizen environmental groups to
make difficult spending choices across priority areas. Indeed, there are very
good reasons that legal, regulatory, resource, and political hurdles exist.
Yet, enforcement cannot meet expectations for real results with
hurdles in the way. Communities hope and expect that someone will enforce
pollution permits and standards. There is clear frustration over the lack of
enforcement in communities, especially environmental justice communities.
Community groups in Chicago, Illinois, have vehemently objected to the lack
of city and state government enforcement action to go beyond citations at an
asphalt plant that has had a questionable history on accounting for all
pollution sources in permit applications.225 Communities in Camden, New
Jersey, have dealt with situations where the state cited and fined a plant for
16 violations of state environmental regulations, but the plant never paid the
fines, the odors did not cease, and the group discovered that the plant's odor
control equipment was not sufficient to control the odors produced by its
operations.226 In listening sessions conducted by Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection in 2017, one commenter testified that there is really
no information provided to the public about permit violations.227 In listening
223

JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER 4 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45825.pdf.
224
Benton, supra note 136, at 200.
225
Stop MAT Asphalt!, NEIGHBORS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, https://n4ej.org/stopmat-asphalt/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
226
Sheila R. Foster, The Challenge of Environmental Justice, 1 RUTGERS J. L. & URB.
POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2004) (the citizens with the help of pro bono attorneys, filed a lawsuit
demanding that the DEP bring the plant into compliance with environmental regulations. The
lawsuit was eventually settled.)
227
Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, Office of Environmental Justice Listening Session
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sessions conducted by the FERC in the spring of 2021, individuals from
across the nation commented that the FERC certificate processes have
favored corporate fossil fuel applicants in administrative hearings at the
expense of actual people, particularly those in rural and low-income
communities.228
Moreover, with hurdles in the way, enforcement cannot address the
issues that researchers and auditors have found with fairness and process
within environmental enforcement. As recently as July 2021, researchers
studied administrative data from state implementation of the CWA and
demographic information around large, regulated facilities and found that
state regulators’ inspection response time is slower toward noncompliant
facilities located in communities that have higher percentages of poor and
Hispanic citizens.229 Other researchers have found disparities in other kinds
of enforcement actions beyond inspection, including cleanup actions, formal
notices of violation, informal citations, administrative orders, consent
decrees, and civil penalties.230 In addition, a state audit in New Orleans found
that it could take as long as nine years from the time a company was cited for
violating emission standards before it was ordered to pay a fine or had a
settlement approved requiring the company to pay for a mitigation project.231
Such findings in research and audits are likely to continue in a world of
continued hurdles to actual enforceability of environmental laws and
regulations.
Failure to recognize enforcement hurdles could lead to further
unexpected consequences. Industry defendants might push for opportunities
to use preclusion arguments by quickly settling with state enforcers, knowing
that federal enforcers are more likely to require greater penalties and
remedies for communities.232 Regulation writers might assume that because
Tour:
Comment
Document
9
cmt.22
(2017),
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnvironmentalJustice/Pages/Listening
-Sessions.aspx.
228
FERC Office of Pub. Participation, Listening Sessions: Landowners and
Communities Affected by Infrastructure Development, Docket No. AD21-9-000 (Mar. 17,
2021), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/events/opp-listening-sessions-landowners-andcommunities-affected-infrastructure.
229
David M Konisky et al., Environmental Injustice in Clean Water Act Enforcement:
Racial and Income Disparities in Inspection Time, 16 ENVTL. RSCH. LETTERS 084020
(2021), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac1225/meta.
230
Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 9 J.
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 625 (1994).
231
See, e.g., Audit: Louisiana Needs to Improve Emissions Enforcement, AP NEWS (Jan.
26,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-louisiana5a7047ce2bc7eb6b45a2d87bb4883c1a (In New Orleans, a state audit).
232
Ethan Ware, Williams Mullins Law Firm, DOJ Defers to States for CWA
Enforcement, JD SUPRA (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/doj-defers-to-
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many environmental laws operate under a cooperative federalism model,
state and local preemption is not a significant concern in environmental
law.233 Scholars might think that citizen suit enforcement can gap-fill for low
agency enforcement resources, when in reality, preclusion and preemption
hurdles impede citizen suit enforcement too.234 Environmental funders may
put money towards enforcement efforts that are ultimately ineffective. At a
minimum, an understanding of the impact of hurdles to enforceability is
central to any environmental law or regulation’s long-term compliance (and
noncompliance) outlook.235
.
B. Use of The Term “Enforceable”
Many of the nation’s environmental statutes and regulations
frequently use the term “enforceable” to refer to pollution and anti-pollution
standards. The term appears in statutes so varied as to cover environmental
mitigation, coastal pollution, point source water discharges, air emissions,
and credit trading programs. In some statutes, as described below, the term
appears prominently, while in other statutes the term is buried within the
definition of a definition of another relevant term. It is important, nonetheless,
to recognize the existence of the term and where and how it is used before
attempting to understand and define it.
states-for-cwa-enforcement-3382854/ (“The threat of EPA administrative action often
drives industry to consider quick, administrative settlements with state or local
environmental agencies for even the slightest environmental violations. Unless the Biden
Administration changes course, industries can now do the same to avoid federal civil
actions for Clean Water Act violations”).
233
See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 43 (2003),
(describing that “preemption is unlikely to be a major doctrinal issue in the ‘cooperative
federalism’ context” because states are allowed to set more stringent standards).
234
David Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Reevaluating Environmental Citizen Suits
in Theory and Practice, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 385, 385 (2020) (“Citizen suits are frequently
cited as an essential legal innovation by virtue of their capacity to provide a backstop to lax
or ideologically antagonistic administrations.”).
235
Some state governments and the Biden administration are indeed starting to look at
hurdles in enforcement. See, e.g., Amanda K. Clark, There’s a Push to Increase Fines from
Colorado Polluters and Directly Impact Local Communities, THE COLORADO SUN (Feb. 21,
2020), https://coloradosun.com/2020/02/21/increased-penalties-pollution-environmentaljustice/; Memorandum from Lawrence E. Starfield, EPA Acting Ass’t Adm’r, to Sr.
Managers and Special Agents, Office of Crim. Enforcement, Forensics and Training, and
Regional Crim. Enforcement Counsels, Strengthening Environmental Justice Through
Criminal Enforcement (June 21, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/202107/strengtheningejthroughcriminal062121.pdf (stating that EPA will strive to ensure that
prosecutions generate remedies that yield meaningful results and protections for
communities that have been harmed, including restitution).
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NEPA: Under NEPA, agencies must conduct some level of
environmental review for any federal action that significantly affects the
environment, including, for example, funding of large polluting infrastructure
projects like pipelines, roads, and railways. 236 An agency may issue a Finding
of No Significant Environmental Impact (FONSI) and skip the more detailed
level of environmental review, so long as the agency commits to performing
mitigation measures to avoid, rectify, or minimize the adverse environmental
impact of the project.237 This type of so-called “mitigated FONSI,” however,
requires that the mitigation measures are enforceable.238 In addition, under
California’s NEPA equivalent, a public agency is required to mitigate or
avoid significant environmental effects of a project if it is feasible to do so
and such mitigation measures adopted by the agency must be fully
enforceable.239
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990
(CZARA): The CZARA refers to the term “enforceable” in its coastal
nonpoint pollution control program, which was established under the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), sets
management measures for states to use in controlling runoff from agriculture,
forestry, urban areas, marinas, and hydromodification.240 All coastal and
Great Lakes states and territories that participate in the program are required
to develop state coastal nonpoint pollution control programs.241 Before
approving a management program submitted by a coastal state, NOAA must
find that the management program contains enforceable policies and
mechanisms to implement the applicable requirements of the state’s
program.242
The CWA: The CWA also references the term “enforceable,”
particularly in its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit system.243 Under the CWA's NPDES permit system, the states are
236
Lanessa Chaplin, For I-81 and Environmental Justice Details Matter More Than
Words, NYCLU (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/i-81-andenvironmental-justice-details-matter-more-words.
237
Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, to
Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies, Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring
and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact 7 & n.18
(Jan.
14,
2011),
https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-andguidance/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf.
238
Id.
239
CEQA § 21081.6, subd. (b).
240
Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, Office for Coastal Management,
NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/pollutioncontrol/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
241
Id.
242
16 U.S.C §§ 1455(d)(16).
243
In general, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by any person unless a
statutory exception applies. The most prominent exception is for holders of a NPDES permit.
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required to develop water quality standards.244 To meet national water quality
standards set by EPA, a polluter must comply with effluent limitations, as
proscribed in a NPDES permit.245 The CWA defines an effluent limitation as
any restriction established for a pollutant discharged from the source,
including schedules of compliance.246 Further, the CWA defines “schedule
of compliance” as “a schedule of remedial measures including an enforceable
sequence of actions or operations leading to compliance with an effluent
limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or standard.”247 The CWA also
requires publicly owned treatment works (POTW) to develop a pretreatment
program. EPA implementing regulations require that the state agency then
reissue the POTW’s NPDES permit to incorporate the approved pretreatment
program as enforceable conditions of the NPDES permit.248
Underground Injection Control Regulations: The Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
use the term “enforceable” for their underground injection control program
in ways that are similar to the CWA.249 Under the relevant regulations,
underground injection activities, including construction of an injection well,
are prohibited until the owner or operator is authorized by permit.250 The
regulations allow for permits to include a “schedule of compliance.”251 In
addition, like the CWA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) includes underground storage
tank regulations that also define a schedule of compliance as remedial
measures, including an enforceable sequence of interim requirements, such
as, actions, operations, or milestone events.252 Such remedial measures are
important for communities, particularly given the kinds of substances
regulated by underground injection control (UIC) permits, including
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and other highly polluting substances.253
The RCRA: Regulations under the RCRA require owners and
operators who treat or store hazardous waste at a unit under a permit to

33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342.
244
33 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
245
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A).
246
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
247
33 U.S.C. § 1362(17).
248
40 C.F.R. § 403.8(c).
249
40 C.F.R. § 144.31.
250
Id.
251
40 C.F.R. 147.2921.
252
40 C.F.R. 144.3.
253
EPA, INTRODUCTION TO THE UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM (2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201806/documents/introduction_to_training_course_and_uic_overview_2018__nathan_wiser.pdf.
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demonstrate financial assurance for the closure and liability of such unit.254
An owner or operator may meet the financial assurance requirements by
obtaining a written guarantee from a specified kind of firm, including a firm
with a “substantial business relationship” with the owner or operator.255 In
order to qualify as a “substantial business relationship,” the relationship must
be the kind of business relationship necessary under relevant state law to
ensure that a guarantee contract issued in connection with that relationship is
valid and enforceable.256 The RCRA also requires that owners/operators must
have permits, or another enforceable document, for the active life and post
closure period of hazardous waste units.257
The CAA: Regulations implementing the CAA use the term
“enforceable” extensively throughout the formulation and implementation of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).258 Pursuant to the
CAA, EPA designates areas of the country as either in “attainment,”
“nonattainment,” or “unclassifiable.” Afterwards it is up to the states to draft
a SIP for each pollutant (subject to EPA approval) that specifies how the state
will achieve or maintain attainment status.259 The CAA requires that a SIP
include enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means,
or techniques.260 Additionally, EPA regulations regarding SIPs specify that a
regulatory limit is not enforceable if it is impractical to determine compliance
with the published limit.261 Further, EPA can only approve a re-designation
for attainment status if, among other things, EPA determines that the
improvement in air quality is due to permanent and enforceable reductions in
emissions.262

254

40 C.F.R. § 267.143.
40 C.F.R. § 267.143 (g)(1).
256
40 C.F.R. § 267.141 (h).
257
40 C.F.R. § 270.1(c).
258
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–09 (The EPA, in setting the NAAQS for specific regions of the
country, specifies the maximum permissible concentration of health based pollutants in the
ambient air).
259
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)-(k).
260
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). In addition, The EPA’s guidance for a SIP’s inclusion of
energy efficiency measures from electricity generation emphasizes that emission reductions
included in SIP’s must be quantifiable, surplus, and enforceable. See Memorandum from
Brian McLean, Dir. Office of Atmospheric Programs, & Steve Page, Dir. Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, to Regional Air Div. Directors, Guidance on SIP Credits
for Emission Reductions from Electric-Sector Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Measures, (Aug. 5, 2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201602/documents/guidance_on_sip_credits.pdf.
261
State Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13568 (proposed Apr. 16, 1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (One of these principles is enforceability which requires
that SIPs . . . be “enforceable in practice.”).
262
42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E).
255
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The CAA also requires that the SIPs for nonattainment areas provide
for the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as
expeditiously as practicable.263 Such SIPs must also specifically include
enforceable emission limitations, and such other control measures, means or
techniques (including economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits,
and auctions of emission rights), as may be necessary or appropriate to
provide for attainment of such standard.264 In a 1997 case, after EPA revised
the NAAQS for ozone, several states, environmental groups, and trade
associations challenged EPA's conclusion that states could satisfy the
applicable reasonable available control technology (RACT) requirement by
participating in two specific cap-and-trade programs.265 The court found that
the CAA authorizes EPA to approve market-based measures in addition to
other enforceable controls.266 The cap and trade program itself was not
enough to meet the enforceable requirement.267 Similarly, in a 2015 case,
EPA determined that the Cincinnati–Hamilton metropolitan area had attained
the NAAQS for particulate matter, in part due to regional cap-and-trade
programs that reduced the flow of interstate pollution.268 Pointing to the
language of the CAA, plaintiff Sierra Club argued that Congress did not
intend for reductions attributable to cap-and-trade programs to meet the
“enforceable” requirement for re-designation.269 The Court ultimately
disagreed with Sierra Club, but struggled in its decision, specifically noting
that the CAA does not define enforceable nor did the Sierra Club offer a
definition.270
The term “enforceable” is also increasingly arising in laws and
regulations involving greenhouse gas emissions. For example, EPA
regulations under the CAA establish national standards of performance
(NSPs) limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from certain designated
power plants.271 Standards of performance for designated facilities included
under a state’s plan must be demonstrated to be quantifiable, verifiable,
permanent, and enforceable with respect to each designated power plant.272
State market-based regulations, such as California’s trading program for
GHGs, also refer to the term “enforceable” in definitions of offsets. In order
to qualify as an emission reduction, the offsets must be real, permanent,
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quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable.273 Such language for GHG
programs is the same as language from emission banking and offset programs
for other pollutants in many states, such as Arizona’s voluntary emissions
banking system for NAAQS pollutants.274
C. Defining “Enforceable”
Widespread use of the term “enforceable” in environmental law
certainly signals an intent by drafters to focus on actual implementation of
environmental law. Yet, despite such widespread use of the term, there is no
unified definition or understanding of the term. To be sure, there are scattered
definitions in white papers, agency regulations, and guidance documents.275
Yet, without a clear picture of what the term “enforceable” means in practice,
it has little substantive effect when drafters use it in environmental law.
Moreover, it sets up expectations, particularly for local communities most
affected by environmental noncompliance, that ignore the realities of the
hurdles that exist in actual enforceability.
Within regulations implementing the CAA alone, there are multiple
definitions and interpretations of the term “enforceable.” EPA’s CAA
regulations for air quality standards on tribal lands provide that “an emission
limitation or other standard is legally enforceable if the reviewing authority
has the right to enforce it.”276 The preamble to EPA’s regulation for redesignation and SIPs, for example, states that:
Measures are enforceable when they are duly
adopted, and specify clear, unambiguous, and
measurable requirements.277 A legal means for
273

See, e.g., The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH &
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ensuring that sources are in compliance with
the control measure must also exist in order for
a measure to be enforceable.278
The state of Arizona defines enforceable under its voluntary NAAQS
pollutant banking system as requiring specific measures for assessing
compliance with an emission limitation, control, or other requirement, in a
manner that allows compliance to be readily determined by an inspection of
records and reports.279 EPA also has further CAA guidance that uses the
phrase “enforceable as a practical matter” or “practically enforceable” to
further qualify the term enforceable for air permits under the CAA.280 In order
for air permits to be “enforceable as a practical matter,” they must include
information on “applicability, compliance date, and specificity of conduct,
any incorporation by reference, and exemptions and exceptions.”281
Other environmental laws and regulations such as in agency specific
NEPA regulations, use the term “feasible” to denote similar concepts as in
use of the term “enforceable.” For example, to comply with the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), an environmental impact report's
mitigation measures must be enforceable and likely to be effective, so as to
ensure that feasible mitigation measures will actually be implemented as a
condition of development, and not merely adopted and then neglected or
disregarded.282 CEQA regulations further define “feasible” as “capable of
being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of
federal air pollutant control regulations and other permanent and enforceable reductions. 42
U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E). After Congress amended the CAA in 1990, EPA articulated its
interpretation of this provision of the statute in “State Implementation Plans: General
Preamble for the Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990”
(“General Preamble”). 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13,561–64 (Apr. 16, 1992).
278
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Act Amendments of 1990” (“General Preamble”). 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498, 13,561–64 (Apr. 16,
1992)).
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time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and
technological factors.”283 The U.S. Army’s NEPA regulations also look at
specific factors in deciding whether proposed mitigation measures are
“practical,” including “military mission, manpower restrictions, cost,
institutional barriers, technical feasibility, and public acceptance.”284 Further,
the U.S. Army NEPA regulations state that “practicality does not necessarily
ensure resolution of conflicts among these items, rather it is the degree of
conflict that determines practicality.”285
Without more clarity on these terms like “enforceable,” “feasible,”
and “practical,” courts will continue to struggle as they already do. For
example, courts currently diverge when it comes to evaluating the validity of
FONSIs that rely on agreements by regulated entities to implement certain
mitigation measures. In Hillsdale, the Tenth Circuit upheld a mitigation
agreement between the project applicant and the state agency, despite
plaintiff’s concern over the agreement’s enforceability.286 In that case, the
federal government, in issuing a FONSI for fugitive dust emissions
associated with the project, also entered into a binding agreement with the
state environmental agency to monitor dust emissions at the project site and
adopt mitigation measures should emissions exceed specified levels. 287 If
dust concentrations exceeded specified levels, the project applicant was
required to work with KDHE to determine the cause of the elevated dust
emissions and then take steps to reduce those emissions.288 The plaintiffs in
Hillsdale argued that there were no studies supporting the effectiveness of
the mitigation options in the agreement, and that the monitoring period was
too brief because it did not cover construction of the intermodal facility and
would expire in two years.289 The court, however, found that even in the
absence of studies, the federal agency did not commit a clear error in
judgment by basing its FONSI on the mitigation agreement, presuming that
the state agency would later uphold its duty to protect air quality and either
extend the mitigation agreement or continue independent monitoring, as
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necessary.290 By contrast, in other cases like Davis, the Tenth Circuit found
insufficient a FONSI that relied on a mere list of potential noise abatement
mitigation measures associated with a large road project without any
supporting data or any basis for concluding the measures would actually
occur.291 The plan in that case made no firm commitment to any noise
mitigation measures, and the environmental analysis leading up to the FONSI
had actually rejected a number of the proposed mitigation measures as
incompatible with the project's purpose.292 Moreover, when agencies have
not pursued a FONSI and instead completed a more detailed environmental
review, courts have found that proposed mitigation measures “need not be
legally enforceable, funded or even in final form to comply with NEPA’s
procedural requirements.”293 A more informed understanding of the term
“enforceable” would help courts grapple with how to evaluate mitigation
measures proposed in a NEPA FONSI court challenge.
Thus, as a starting point, the federal government, particularly the
OMB, should issue guidance on the term “enforceable” (and related terms
like feasible). Current OMB guidance on regulatory development simply
states that agencies should consider the “best enforcement framework”
including “on-site inspections, periodic reporting, and noncompliance
penalties.”294 Such guidance on a whole, however, provides little instruction
for a topic as fundamental as enforcement. An amendment to this current
OMB guidance to more deeply consider the terms and phrases “enforceable,”
“enforceable as a practical matter,” “practical,” and “feasible,” is warranted.
Indeed, the OMB should consider issuing an amended guidance
document on environmental enforcement and the term “enforceable.” In
particular, such amended guidance should state that a pollution or antipollution standard is enforceable only if enforcers have the resource,
regulatory, and legal ability to enforce against violations. 295 Under such a
290
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definition, the term “enforceable” would include agency consideration of the
likelihood of funding for the anticipated enforcer.296 Under such a definition,
the term “enforceable” would include the likelihood of anticipated enforcers
facing preclusion or preemption claims in an eventual enforcement action.297
Under such a definition, the term “enforceable” would also include clear
anticipation of defenses, including those based on exceptions, permit shields,
and other parts of the underlying regulation itself. In essence, amended OMB
guidance would require agencies to consider upfront, in drafting regulations
and guidance, the realities enforcers are likely to face in the future, when
inevitable non-compliance amongst regulated entities surfaces.
Further, such amended guidance should clarify that while establishing
a regime for the potential ability to enforce against violations is important, it
is not sufficient. Such a focus on a regime for potential enforcement is not
without merit. Indeed, any enforcement regime must start with authority to
enforce.298 The dictionary defines “able” as having the power, skill, means,
or opportunity to do something.299 Thus, it makes sense that providing
enforcers with the power, skill, means, or opportunity to enforce goes to the
core of the term enforce-able. The problem of course is that in practice,
merely establishing a regime for potential enforcement does not translate to
actual enforcement. Indeed, the dictionary defines “feasible” as possible to
do easily or conveniently, likely, or probable.300 Thus, amended guidance
emission standard is enforceable if it specifies a limitation and a time period for the
limitation, compliance requirements are clearly defined, the facility responsible for
compliance and liable for violations can be identified, each compliance activity or measure
is enforceable as a practical matter, and the EPA, state, and third parties maintain the ability
to enforce against violations. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.5755a (f).
296
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resulting from any voluntary measures.”).
297
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should grapple with the use of terms like “enforceable” and “feasible” to help
ensure that future enforcement will not only potentially exist, but also have
the real ability to actually exist.301
This is not the first article to push for more rigor in environmental law
and regulation. Professor Joseph Aldy, for example, has recently pushed for
EPA to stage a framework for retrospective analysis of a regulation.
According to Aldy, designing and implementing rules to enable retrospective
analyses can produce information about the realized environmental
outcomes, public-health impacts, benefits, costs, labor-market impacts, and
other factors.302 Other scholars spend ample time debating how cost-benefit
analysis should be (or not be) redone.303 Still other scholars are arguing for
new environmental regulations in areas that are not regulated at all or underregulated, such as energy efficiency, and coal ash disposal.304 That is not to
say that scholars are not addressing individual legal and regulatory hurdles to
enforcement in given contexts. For example, scholars have identified key
preemption hurdles to implementation and enforcement of energy efficiency
standards.305 Yet, with the importance of enforcement and enforceability as a
crosscutting topic across multiple areas of environmental law, it is time to
examine environmental enforceability across agency drafting writ large, and
that should come through guidance from the top.
CONCLUSION
This article argues for consideration of resource, regulatory, and legal
hurdles in attempts to make pollution and anti-pollution standards actually
enforceable over the long-term in the United States. However, because
enforcement agencies abroad face similar hurdles and enforceability concerns
as in the United States, there is significant opportunity for increased scholarly
webster.com/dictionary/feasible (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
301
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and practice-based attention to these issues in the international context as
well.306 In China, scholars have recognized the importance of political
hurdles, suggesting that that local pollution enforcement officials in particular
are often beholden to local political officials who tend to favor development
and industry interests over environmental concerns.307 In India, researchers
have found that coordination and state/federal jurisdictional hurdles, similar
to preclusion and preemption hurdles in the United States, are barriers to
effective environmental enforcement.308 On the case study identified in this
article, it is clear that the European Union is looking to the United States for
ideas on enforcement of defeat devices, which are a pervasive noncompliance problem in multiple European countries.309 Deeper discussion
over hurdles to environmental enforceability in the international context is
beyond the scope of this article. However, it is likely an excellent topic for
established international networks, such as the International Network for
Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), to undertake.310
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